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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND ENERGY ECONOMICS 
BY 
FARAZ FARHIDI 
August 2018 
Committee Chair: Dr. Garth Heutel 
Major Department: Economics 
 
This dissertation consists of three separate chapters using theory, simulation, empirical 
techniques, and also an experiment to address several questions relating to utilizing fossil fuel-
based energy and its consequences on environment and society.  
My first essay, titled “Endogenous Population Growth in a Macro Environmental Model,” 
simulated, based on U.S. calibrated data, the effect of utilizing clean energy vs. fossil fuel energy 
on long-run economic growth and its impact on the total welfare of the society. I present a 
dynamic growth model that explicitly allows for the interaction between an economy and an 
environment. I allow for endogenous population growth, where population is affected by living 
standards and level of industrialization as well as natural resources, indirectly through 
production. Endogenizing the population growth the growth rate of GDP per capita is lower 
under endogenous population scenario relative to exogenous population growth. Imposing 
carbon-tax element on the energy producers’ profit would accelerate the adaptation of the clean 
energy and sustain fossil fuel resources for a more extended period and would increase the 
individuals’ long-term total consumption. 
The second essay, titled “Having Skin in the Energy Game: The Impact of Social Norms on 
Energy Regime Changes.” In this paper, I present a survey study in an experimental field context 
that explores the social norms effect on petition signing, focusing on clean energy adaptation 
instead of fossil fuel energy. I use multiple energy consumption data at the national level for 
selected countries. This research highlights that not only social norms could be compelling 
individuals’ behavior, but also that they are sensitive to the types of information which are 
disclosed to them. 
I develop my final essay, titled “Energy Fallout: Air Pollution Effects on Environmental and 
Social Externalities,” estimated the effect of different types of energy consumption on mortality 
rates and violent crimes. This study aims to estimate a reduced-form model that could explain 
and then verify the possible relation between crime rates and mortality rates that arise from the 
different energy regimes utilization in affected regions, using mechanism effect analysis; while 
air pollution and level of income are two channels of this causation analysis. 
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I. Endogenous Population Growth in a Macro Environmental Model  
Introduction 
While the Industrial Revolution allowed for the development of new schemes of utilizing 
fossil fuel resources that ultimately lead to economic growth (Stern, 2011), there is solid 
evidence that devastating effects of climate change—due to the use of fossil fuel-based energy—
will take place unless major actions are taken immediately to transform our fossil fuel-based 
energy system into a non-fossil fuel-based system (Schwartzman, 2008). Predicting the 
economy’s future growth path—while taking into consideration the effects of the environmental 
degradation—is of the utmost importance. In this regard, there are often two overlooked issues in 
the macro environmental literature: Many macro models assume that population growth is 
exogenous and does not feedback on the environment. Second, most of the environmental 
approaches do not include the binding constraint of non-renewable resources into their model1.   
In this paper, I extend macro environmental framework by allowing for both non-renewable 
and renewable energy, and by endogenizing population growth, using both social planner and 
market-based approaches. The effect of population growth on economic activities is not clear 
based on different models and approaches. Hardin (1968) argues that to have a sustainable 
economy, population growth must be zero to keep our limited resources from being over-
utilized. Meadows, et al. (1972) report that the Earth's industrial capacity and the population 
would catastrophically decline if we continue the level of capital accumulation that Turner 
(2007) and Hall & Day (2009) show. However, Grossman & Helpman (1991) and Aghion & 
Howitt (1998) claim that high population spurs technological change, which is the engine of 
                                                          
1 Basically, there is no end point in their prediction. 
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economic growth (Romer, 1990; Jones, 2002). Building upon the existing endogenous 
population growth framework, I connect population growth with not only the living standards 
and level of industrialization but also with the adaptation of renewable energy resources. By 
solving the proposed model and making predictions based on the different energy adaptation 
scenarios, policy recommendations will be derived.  
The main contribution of this work is: moving away from the exogenous population growth as 
in the existing climate models, adjusting the framework proposed in the endogenous population 
studies such as Cigno (1981), Ehrlich and Lui (1997), Nerlove and Rault (1997), and Krutilla and 
Reuveny (2006); and adding a resource binding constraint to create a tradeoff between renewable 
and non-renewable energies. The other contribution is to modify a new model for technological 
progress in which new technology is a function of existed technology, number of researchers, 
and investment. Financing new advancement in technology, which has been neglected from the 
previous works, is vital in the proposed setup. In the model, energy is the primary factor in the 
production process, the same as technological progress, labor forces, and physical capital. 
Stiglitz (1974) explores the implications of introducing exhaustible natural resources. In his 
model, natural resources can make the system unstable, as an essential factor of production. 
Hartwick (1977), Nordhaus (1996, 2008), Popp (2004), Hassler & Krusell (2012), Krusell et al. 
(2016) and Kummel (2016) present similar models in which energy is considered a primary 
factor of production and is used to identify the impact of resource constraints on economic 
activity and the environment. However, the energy itself can be substituted by any other source 
of renewable energy. In the model setup, there are binding constraints for the resources—
following Acemoglu et al. (2012)—which limit growth.  
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The proposed model assumes that while population is important for the economy’s growth 
path by providing labor force and researchers, it has an adverse impact on the economy due to 
the constraints of the environment and resources. As a result of endogenizing the population 
growth, while environmental erosion is included, the growth rate in the economy would be 
slower relative to the exogenous scenario. One of the reasons for such a different conclusion is 
that population leads to the economic growth through providing labor forces for the production 
process in both scenarios. In the endogenous case, however, there is feedback from 
environmental erosion on population, which diminishes the sources for future economic growth. 
Another important finding is that there would be a smooth transition in the economic activity 
during the adaptation of the production process that relies entirely on using renewable energy as 
a primary energy factor if the population is considered exogenous. Comparing two modified 
approaches to solve the model, I show that in the market-based method the firms utilize 
intensively more fossil fuel, relative to the social planner approach. The rate of clean energy 
adaptation would be lower relative to the centralized method. Considering nonlinear interactions 
between the elements in the environment (Dawson et al. 2010), using exhaustively fossil fuel-
based energy leads to a more catastrophe complication in our ecosystem.   
The paper is formatted as follows: The second section below reviews the existing literature 
which is connected to this research. Section three presents a theoretical model that can be used to 
verify the validity of the discussed questions in this research, with a following short section on 
solving the model and calibrating the parameters. Then, I propose a decentralized model, which 
is closer to the current market structure in the developed countries. In the fifth section, the results 
of the social planner solution will be discussed for both exogenous and endogenous population 
growth, as well as a comparison between two different methods will be examined. Lastly, I 
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introduce two policy recommendations to the market-based approach and present a welfare 
analysis.   
Literature Review 
The existing literature in endogenous growth has focused on technology and rarely on 
population impacts, whereas the literature on environmental degradation, caused by utilizing 
fossil fuel energy, has relied mostly on exogenous technology and population growth as 
reviewed below. The scholarship has not yet studied a comprehensive model in which the often-
discussed elements have been fully addressed. Recent endogenous growth models, such as AK2, 
R&D, and Schumpeterian growth models, explicitly allow for optimizing the technological 
process. In those models, both innovation and capital accumulation can determine the long-run 
growth rate. In the long run, the stock of ideas is proportional to the worldwide research effort, 
which in turn is proportional to the total population of innovating countries (Jones, 2002). 
Acemoglu et al. (2012) introduce environmental constraints into a growth model with competing 
innovation applications. The fact that knowledge spillovers create positive externalities plays a 
crucial role in the ultimate cost of climate and technology policies (Fischer & Heutel, 2013). 
Climate change engineered by human activity is a pure externality with global scope. The 
fossil-fuel use causes emissions of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere and results in global 
warming, thus imposing a cost that impacts not only all living humans but also future generations 
(Hassler & Krusell, 2012; Krusell et al. 2016). Mathiesen et al. (2011) reveal that utilizing 
renewable energy and more efficient conversion energy technologies can have positive 
                                                          
2 AK model is one the first models which attempts to endogenize the economic growth by using a model in which 
output is a linear function of capital (Y=AK). 
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socioeconomic impacts and lead to a potentially higher rate of employment and earnings. Fully 
renewable energy systems will be technically achievable soon and can be economically 
beneficial, compared to current energy systems. Tahvonen and Salo (2001) believe that there 
would be a smooth shift from non-renewable to renewable resources, and it causes a drop in the 
future economic growth which is going to recover after some period. Sustainability of 
development depending on renewable resources has been confirmed by other researchers such as 
Li and Lofgren (2000) and Lund (2007).  
Stiglitz (1974) explores the assumptions of introducing exhaustible natural resources, which 
can make a system unstable, as an essential factor of production with a constant rate of 
population growth. Later on, Kummel et al. (2002) present a more advanced model, called 
KLEC, in which the combination of capital, labor, energy, and creativity produces a final good. 
Nordhaus (1977, 1994, 2000, 2008, 2011), Golosov et al. (2012), and Hassler and Krusell (2012) 
have pioneered the area by building integrated assessment models (vastly known as DICE and 
RICE) expanding neoclassical growth models. They augmented essentially with a set of climate 
equations mapping atmospheric carbon into temperature and energy sectors, allowing people to 
expend costly resources to limit emissions from a given amount of use of fossil fuels. There 
exists another line of literature (employed by Bernstein et al. 1999, Rutherford et al. 2009, and 
others) that explores the impacts of climate policies on the energy market and economy using 
Multi-Sector, Multi-Region Trade (MS-MRT) based on computable general equilibrium method 
(CGE). But the role of population in all of the mentioned models has been neglected.  
Ehrlich & Ehrlich (1990) claim there is an issue with overpopulation in a region relative to its 
resources and the ability of the environment to sustain human activities. Recent issues such as 
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climate change, the global decline in population growth rate, and the recent economic downturn 
have prompted renewed concern about whether long-standing trajectories of the population and 
economic growth can continue (Brown et al. 2004). Meadows et al. (1972) state that the earth's 
industrial capacity and population would catastrophically decline if we continue the level of 
capital accumulation that Turner (2007) and Hall and Day (2009) show. Following Lee (1988), 
Kremer (1993) constructs an integrated model of population growth and technological change; 
the proposed empirical evidence supports his model that the growth rate of the world population 
has been proportional to the degree of population. These results are opposed by pioneering 
economists such as Becker and Barro (1989) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) who believe that 
population growth hurts income per capita.  
Setting up a model of endogenous technological change that nests the Romer (1990) and the 
Jones (1995a) frameworks, Prettner (2013) considers the associated costs of having children 
involved in endogenous fertility decisions of households. He indicates that underlying 
demographic processes play a vital role in characterizing the R&D intensity and, therefore, affect 
long-run economic growth contexts of industrialized countries. Nerlove & Rault (1997) modified 
the 1956 Solow-Swan model by introducing a simple form of an endogenous population and 
showing that as income grows, fertility rate might not change because both birth and death rates 
fall, and physical and human capital per capita increase over time.  
Cigno (1981) was the first to argue that the assumption of a constant rate of population 
growth is implausible in an economy constrained by exhaustible resources and examined the 
implications of making the population growth rate a function of consumption and capital per 
capita. Fanti and Manfredi (2003) build on Solow’s model and account for the continuation of a 
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delay in the process of employment, due to the age structure of the population. They also utilize 
the existence of a Malthusian relation between wage and fertility, to generate stable fluctuating 
growth paths. An interesting consequence of the presence of the endogenous population in their 
model is that population growth may eventually promote economic growth. Later on, Krutilla 
and Reuveny (2006) evaluate the dynamic effects of incorporating an endogenous process for 
population growth into a renewable resource-based growth model. Their model is abstract in the 
Macroeconomics sense since there is no capital accumulation and production process. In their 
model, renewable energy is only used as a resource; thus, there is no trade-off between 
renewable and non-renewable resources. Moreover, they linked population to renewable 
resources where there is no limit on the non-renewable reserves. They, as did Stokey (1998) and 
Dasgupta and Maler (2000), reemphasize the urgency for the development of growth models that 
include both the environment and endogenous growth for human populations. 
The models we have been discussing so far do not allow for the trade-off between non-
renewable natural resources and renewable resources, or an endogeneity of population growth 
and technological progress. In the current research, to extend the environmental macro models, 
in the climate context such as DICE, my model specification includes endogenous population 
growth—based on the degree of industrialization and income level—as well as endogenous 
technological progress. As such, in the proposed framework, I am able to identify how 
endogenizing the model can affect the growth path of the economy, considering the 
environmental deterioration, and predict long-run growth with different types of energy 
resources. In addition, the model will be calibrated based on not only the U.S. data analysis but 
also the empirical estimation derived from previous work.  
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Model and Solution Method 
In this section, first, I plan to build up the model in the following sub-section. Then, I am 
going to disclose how values have been assigned to different parameters. In the third and fourth 
sub-sections, the method to solve the model will be explained.     
Constructing the model 
There is a representative consumer in the model—consistent with the Ramsey-type models—
with a utility function of a single commodity that is consumed at different points across time. 
The utility function includes a discounting factor to smooth consumption over time. The 
consumption good is delivered with an aggregate production function of technology, capital, 
labor, and energy, and it allows for the environmental degradation. Technological progress in 
clean energy, as well as the population growth, is endogenous in this model. Capital is 
accumulated in a standard Solow model, taking investment and consumption to be perfect 
substitutes. 
 Utility function 
The following model is a modified version of the Popp (2004) model3, which is an extension 
of the DICE model itself by endogenizing the technological progress based on R&D models. I 
also endogenized population, according to the process in Cigno (1981). There is a possibility of 
making a model stochastic by adding exogenous shock to the technological progress and the new 
resource discoveries. In the proposed model, social planner maximizes the utility which is a 
                                                          
3 I will use the discrete model excluding the population in utility function according to Hassler & Krusell (2012). 
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function of consumption per capita, (Eq. 1) subjects to the income constraint (Eq. 3), in an 
infinite horizon.  
Max⏟
𝐶t,Kt+1,TYt,FEt
= E0 ∑ β
tU(c(t))∞t=0         (1) 
U(c(t)) =
ct
1−σ
1−σ
,     ct =
Ct
Lt
⁄         (2) 
In the equations above, Ut represents utility at time t, Ct is the total consumption, ct is per 
capita consumption, Lt represents the total labor force in the market, β is a discount factor to 
represent the rate of time preference, and σ is the parameter for the risk attitude of the agent. 
 Production allocation 
Yt = Ct + Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt + CEXtFEt + TYt      (3) 
Equation three shows the income allocation in which CEX (the cost of the providing of fossil-
fuel energy4) is derived endogenously in the model. In the above setting, part of the income (TY) 
finances the technology for the clean energy (AC). C is the total consumption, K is the physical 
capital, and FE represents for non-renewable5 energy.  
Yt = EDt[AtKt
αPLt
1−α−γEt
γ]        (4) 
Et = [(CEt)
ρ + FEt
ρ
]
1
ρ⁄          (5) 
                                                          
4 This cost is not exactly equivalent to the cost of extraction in Stiglitz (1976), as it is argued in Appendix I.  
5 Or we can consider it as fossil fuel energy. 
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CEt = ACt ∗ CE          (6) 
EDt = 1 − (
FEt
φ⁄ )
ϑ         (7) 
Here, I included the energy as another primary factor of production (Yt), as did Krusell 
(2016). At is the technological progress, PLt is the fraction of the labor force who directly 
participates in the production process and Et is the energy input required in the production 
process as a primary factor. EDt is the environmental deterioration constraint (or damage 
function), as a decreasing function of the non-renewable energy consumption (FEt). 𝜑 is the 
normalizing factor to keep the negative impact of FEt on the production less than one. Energy is 
another primary factor of production such as technology, physical capital, and labor. A key 
aspect here is that non-renewable energy resources are finite, unlike DICE-RICE models in 
which the fossil fuel supply is treated as inexhaustible (Nordhaus & Boyer, 2000). However, the 
renewable resources, based on the availability of the technology, are infinite. CE is the total 
available stock of clean energy in an area ready to use. However, we can only use part of the 
energy, based on technological advances, ACt, to utilize it. The variables and parameters are 
listed and explained in Appendix I. 
 Clean energy technology 
ACt+1 = AC0ACt
θ(TLtTYt)
ω        (8) 
Popp (2004) used an R&D based model (Jones, 1995) to endogenize the technological 
progress in his model. However, the production technology of the clean energy utilized here is 
the extended version of Jones (2002). Farhidi’s (2017) modification added TY, which is the 
required resources for financing the technology. TL is the effective research effort. ACt is the 
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required technology to utilize clean energy such as solar and wind. The economy consists of two 
types of labor: the researcher who produces a new idea, and the laborers who produce the final 
good as an output.  
 Fossil fuel price 
CEXt = P0 + P1(
∑ FEi
t
i=1
FE̅̅̅̅
⁄ )P2 + P3(
FEt
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
⁄ )P4   ∑ FEi
t
i=1 ≤ FE̅̅̅̅   (9) 
Following the idea in Popp (2004), the cost of extraction of the fossil fuel energy (CEX) is the 
sum of the marginal cost of fuel extraction and a markup, which includes any transaction costs 
according to Equation 9, in which FE̅̅̅̅  is the total fossil fuel available to extract, and it is provided 
by nature. P1 represents changes in marginal cost as the extraction changes, and P2 shows the 
impact of the ratio of fossil fuel accumulation on the price level. Unlike the Popp’s model, there 
is no maximum in this pricing strategy, which equals to P0 + P1, in the last period; however, 
fossil fuel price increases intensively in the later periods due to the last added element 
(P3(
FEi
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
⁄ )P4) to the price function in this setup. This extra factor has been added, compared 
to the Popp’s model, to penalize fossil fuel consumers and unforeseen conflict shocks via price 
increment in future.  
 Population growth   
At+1 = (1 + A̅)At6          (10) 
                                                          
6 We can also consider the technological progress stochastic in the production process to capture any possible 
fluctuation later. 
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PLt + TLt = Lt          (11) 
lPL =
PLt
Lt
 and lTL =
TLt
Lt
                    (12) & (13)  
Technological progress for the production process (At) is considered exogenous. For labor 
force participation, we need to define two ratios (lPL and lTL), which are assumed to be constant 
over time; therefore, the distribution of the labor force does not change between two different 
sectors, which are shown in Equations 12 and 13. 
Lt+1 = (1 + L̅)Lt   (If the population grows exogenously)   (14) 
Lt+1 = Lt + L0(
Yt
Lt
⁄ )ε1(
Lt
Kt
⁄ )ε2  (If the population grows endogenously)   (15) 
Lt is the level of population
7 in an economy. The main distinction of the presented model is 
built as follows. I endogenized the population growth which is directly retrieved from Cigno's 
(1981) model8 by linking it to the environmental degradation through production; therefore, the 
constant population growth in Equation 14 (L̅) was replaced by the setup in Equation 15. 
Therefore, I use Equation 14 for the first specification of the model in which population grows 
exogenously. Then I used Equation 15 in the other model specification.  
It must be noted that income plays an important role in population growth. Fertility theories 
proposed by Becker (Becker 1973; Becker et al. 1994) highlight the indirect influence of living 
standards within this framework. L0 can be derived exogenously by the fact that population is a 
                                                          
7 Population refers to the labor force in the current setup, not the total population of an economy 
8 Krutilla & Reuveny (2006) link the population only to renewable resources since their model does not include 
production process, capital accumulation, and non-renewable resources. 
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biological factor that grows exponentially. But, because of industrialization, the nature of this 
growth has varied over time. The rate of population growth is positively related to per capita 
consumption and inversely related to the degree of industrialization9. There are five choice 
variables in this model: physical capital (K), fossil fuel energy (FE), utilizing the clean energy 
(AC), required resources for financing the clean technology (TY), and the consumption (C).   
Data Calibration 
To calibrate the model’s parameters, I assigned the previously used values (in the literature) to 
the parameters, and I estimated the ones with no existing values, using real data. I used data from 
1990-2012, mostly retrieved from the World Bank Data Center, for the different indices to 
calibrate the parameters using time series analysis for the U.S. only. I also used environmental 
bio-capacity10—retrieved from the Global Footprint Network database—as a proxy for the 
environmental degradation. For the total energy (Et), I included the country's total energy use, 
and then I used renewable energy consumption as a percentage of total energy consumption to 
calculate FEt and CEt (as a proxy to get the required technology for utilizing the clean energy). 
More specifically, I used GDP inflation-adjusted for the total production, total gross capital 
inflation-adjusted using capital formation index, and calculating technological progress (At), 
using methods developed in World Bank’s 2008 report. World Bank provides the data for the 
total population, labor force participation, and the number of researchers in the R&D sector, the 
                                                          
9 Degree of industrialization is the capital-labor ratio. Based on Cigno (1981), industrialization and its concomitant, 
urbanization, have impacts on birth rates which is consistent with the intertemporal utility maximization. It is also 
consistent with the empirical observation that at low levels of industrialization the rate of population growth tends to 
move in the same direction as per capita consumption, while at high levels of industrialization it tends to move in the 
opposite direction.     
10 The bio-capacity has risen as one of the world's dominant measures of human demands on nature. It permits us to 
compute human pressure on the environment (e.g. if everyone lives the lifestyle of the average American, we would 
need at least four more planets). Environmental biocapacity thus focuses on whether the planet can keep up with our 
growing demands. 
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latter index utilized as a proxy for the number of researchers in clean energy production. For the 
technological progress for the clean energy, I used the total R&D spending in the U.S. as a 
proxy.  
For the value of β from the first equation, Max W = ∑ βtU(c(t))Tt=0 , I used 0.96 for the yearly 
discount factor, which is commonly used in growth models. σ, the level of risk aversion in 
Equation 2, U(c(t)) =
ct
1−σ
1−σ
, is equal to 2. A higher (lower) value of σ corresponds to more (less) 
risk-averse agents can be used as well. Using the basic calibration from Krusell (2012), I used 
the parameters for Equation 4 {Yt = μt[AtKt
αPLt
1−α−γEt
γ]} as follows: α = 0.27 , 𝛾 = 0.04. 
I set the parameter ρ to 0.5 based on Popp's (2004) model. To estimate the Equation 8 
parameters (CEXt = P0 + P1(
∑ FEi
t
i=1
FE̅̅̅̅
⁄ )P2 + P3(
FEt
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
⁄ )P4), I used the same values which 
are: P0=276.29, P1=700, and P2=4. According to Popp (2004) [as in RICE model], I then scale 
P0 and P1 by dividing them by hundred to fit into my calibration. Then I assign 3.5 to P3 and 0.9 
to P4 to better capture the price intensity in the future. To estimate the rest of the parameters, I 
used time series analysis which is fully explained in Appendix I (using Equations (B1), (B2) & 
(B4) in Appendix I). The summary of all of the calibrations is shown in Table (1). I did not take 
care of any possible endogeneity in the estimation since the primary reason of doing that is to 
find the benchmark for the non-existence parameters, not to derive the exact values which are out 
of the scope of this study.  
Solving the Growth Path (Exogenous population vs. endogenous) 
To solve the model, first we can simplify the constraints by substituting Equation 6 into 5, and 
then substitute back the new equation (total energy production) and 8 (environmental 
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degradation) into the production function (Eq. 4), yielding Equation C1 (in Appendix I). Then, 
we substitute the modified production function and the price for fossil fuel energy (Eq. 9) into 
the income allocation function (Eq. 3) to get Equation C2. Then, substitute Equations 12 and 13 
into C1 and 8, respectively, for PL and TL, to get the two constraints (Equations C3 and C4) for 
the Lagrangian. Now we can establish the Lagrangian, in which households are maximizing their 
utility over infinite time, for the base model in which the population growth is exogenous.  
ℒ = E0 ∑ [β
t
Ct
Lt
⁄
1−σ
1−σ
+ λ1t {(1 −
FEt
φ
ϑ
) (AtKt
α(lPLLt)
1−α−γ)((ACtCE)
ρ +t:1→∞Ct,FEt,TYt,Kt+1,ACt+1
         FEt
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ − Ct − Kt+1 + (1 − δ)Kt − (P0 + P1 (
∑ FEi
t
i=1
FE0
⁄ )
P2
) FEt − TYt} +
         λ2t{AC0ACt
θ(lPLLtTYt)
ω − ACt+1} + λ3t{(1 + L̅)Lt − Lt+1} + λ4t{(1 + A̅)At − At+1} +
         λ5t{FE̅̅̅̅ − ∑ FEi
t
i=1 }]         (16) 
There are four choice variables in the above functional setup: level of consumption, capital 
investment, investment in the technology of renewable energy resources, and the amount of 
fossil-fuel energy. The total stock of fossil-fuel is constant and a given. Solving the first-order 
conditions (F.O.Cs), we get the Euler equations from the F.O.Cs. The solving process is shown 
in Appendix I. 
Considering the three equations for income allocation (Eq. 3), production (Eq. 4)11, and 
technological production for renewable energy (Eq. 8), and the Euler equations (Eq. C10, C11, 
C12, C13&C14), derived from the F.O.Cs, I can solve for this path using the actual values of the 
                                                          
11 In which total energy consumption (Eq. 5) and environmental degradation (Eq. 7) are included 
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variables for the initial year (t=0)—which are shown in Table (2)—and then update the variables 
based on the above equations. Therefore, I directly use the law of motions (by forward 
iteration)12 to obtain next period values based on the previously driven values. Thus, there is an 
implicit uncertainty about the ending period of fossil fuel energy at the starting point13. To select 
these values, I use 2012 as a reference year, extracted the values for the U.S., and then normalize 
it by million. The amount of clean energy is set to be 8% of the total energy consumption.  
The only issue we have to derive the growth path, using the law of motions is to define the 
value of C0 which is demonstrated in the footnote
14. Having the above values as initial conditions 
(and defining C0 as it has been explained), we can compute the level of production from 
Equation 4, the next period required technology for the clean energy from Equation 8, and the 
cost of extracting the fossil fuel (CEX) from Equation 9. Now, utilizing the budget constraint 
(Equation 3), we can calculate the next period physical capital (Kt+1), knowing all values for the 
                                                          
12 While it seems it might be the first time that the current method of using the decision rules—instead of value 
function iteration—(by using the initial values and Euler equations) has been applied, it has been discussed in some 
cases such as DICE user manual, computational and algorithm aspects, by Nordhaus & Sctorc (2013). The main 
reason that allows me to use the law of motions (for capital, fossil fuel energy and so on) is the exogenous equation 
for the cost of fossil fuel extraction. This extra equation helps me to construct the matrix of the law of motions, 
which depend on each other, and solve them all simultaneously.    
13 Alternatively, I can guess the end period for running out of fossil fuel energy, and iterate it back to the initial 
point. Then, I can do the same process for different ending points to get the highest given utility, and compare the 
new results to the current ones.   
14 Since the understanding of solving this model might seem a bit confusing, alternatively, I can explain a simple 
Ramsey scenario (for a discrete time) in which environment, endogenous technology and population, and energy are 
dropped. Therefore, our Lagrangian gets the following form: ℒ = E0 ∑ [β
t
Ct
Lt
⁄
1−σ
1−σ
+ λt{Yt − Ct − Kt+1 +
t=1→T
Ct,Kt+1
(1 − δ)Kt}. Solving the F.O.C we get: Ct+1 = Ct [(β[𝑓
′(𝐾𝑡+1) + 1 − δ])
1
σ⁄ (1 + L̅)
σ−1
σ⁄ ]. Now, to find the 
consumption path using my approach, we need the initial conditions such as C0, K0 and L0. Since we cannot assign 
an initial value to C0, we use the following procedure, just to derive the initial value for consumption, and then use 
the explained procedure in the main text to drive the growth path. We define a range of possible K1 based on K0 
such as 0.5K0 < K1 < 1.5K0. Then, split the range into 100 possible values for K1 and compute the corresponding 
utility for each of them. The one which maximizes the utility (of the household) would be our “K1.” Then, we can 
use the budget constraint to derive C0. After that, we can use the formula for intertemporal consumption, to derive 
next period consumption and physical capital. Alternatively, we can derive the initial values using the steady state. 
Simply, set Ct+1, and Kt+1 equal to Ct and Kt, and assign the values of Css and Kss as the initial conditions.  Having 
those we are able to derive the pathways for both consumption and physical capital by using the formula for the law 
of motion for consumption and budget constraint.   
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current (t=0) state.  Now, we can update the labor force using Equation 14 for the exogenous 
case. The next period technological progress in the production process (A) can be achieved from 
Equation 10. Therefore, we can use Equation C12 to get the required fossil fuel energy (FE) for 
the next period. At this time, we can use Equation C10 (intertemporal consumption decision) to 
compute the level of consumption for the next period as well. Now, the only unknown variable 
for the next period would be the required resources for financing the clean energy technology 
(TY). Using the last Euler Equation C13, we can calculate the amount of this element. Repeating 
the same process, we can update all values for each period moving forward.  
It must be noted that the approach I develop in this study is not a standard computational 
method. A social planner is not predicting the growth path. The planner maximizes the utility 
each period due to the existing, present resources. Therefore, the backward induction method has 
not been used since the exact time of depletion of natural resources is unknown. This form of set 
up is the real uncertainty of the model, implicitly implemented in the solving process. However, 
the issue of the discoveries uncertainty or the exact time of running out of fossil fuel, in the 
starting point, has not been studied explicitly within this framework since the current setup is 
deterministic, not stochastic. It is also worth mentioning that the social planner does not account 
for the nonrenewable resources constraint in the optimization problem in the beginning but tries 
to deal with it while there are not enough resources left to utilize. The main reason I use a non-
conventional method to solve this model is that the ideology of this research is built on. There is 
no end time for resources (fossil fuel can be replaced by renewable energy); thus, the values of 
the transversality conditions for both physical capital and investment on renewable energy are 
unknown. The proposed approach does not sound quite appealing, but it saves the day.       
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To solve the model for the endogenous population case, we need to change the last constraint 
of the Lagrangian by substituting Equation 14 to 15. Therefore, we can rearrange the equation 
and substitute the production function (Equation 4), and Equation 11 to get the below equation: 
Lt+1 = L0 (1 −
FEt
φ
ϑ
)
ε1
At
ε1Kt
αε1−ε2lPL
ε1−αε1−ε1γLt
ε2−αε1−γε1((ACtCE)
ρ + FEt
ρ
)
γε1
ρ⁄ + Lt (17)  
Changing the third constraint (equation above), we can set our updated Lagrangian for the 
endogenous population growth: 
ℒ = E0 ∑ [β
t
Ct
Lt
⁄
1−σ
1−σ
+ λ1t {(1 −Ct,Lt+1,FEt,TYt,Kt+1,ACt+1
FEt
φ
ϑ
) (AtKt
α(lPLLt)
1−α−γ)((ACtCE)
ρ +          FEt
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ − Ct − Kt+1 + (1 − δ)Kt −
(P0 + P1 (
∑ FEi
t
i=1
FE̅̅̅̅
⁄ )
P2
) FEt − TYt} +          λ2t{AC0ACt
θ(lTLLtTYt)
ω − ACt+1} +
λ3t {L0 (1 −          
FEt
φ
ϑ
)
ε1
At
ε1Kt
αε1−ε2lPL
ε1−αε1−ε1γLt
ε2−αε1−γε1((ACtCE)
ρ + FEt
ρ
)
γε1
ρ⁄ + Lt −
Lt+1} + λ4t{(1 + A̅)At − At+1} + λ5t{FE̅̅̅̅ − ∑ FEi
t
i=1 }]     (18) 
Solving the first-order conditions, I can follow the same process as it has been done for the 
previous case to derive the Euler equations. Deriving the first-order conditions in the endogenous 
model is shown in Appendix I. Having the Euler equations beside the constraints, I am able to 
follow the same process in the exogenous population scenario to update the next period values 
with some minor adjustments. First, I am going to use Equation 15 instead of 14 to update the 
next year's total labor force. And second, I need to solve Equations C25, C27, and C28 
simultaneously to get the next period values for C, FE, and TY.  
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Market-based analysis 
In this section, I plan to develop the decentralized approach based on Golosov et al. (2014). 
The distinction between the current model and the previous one is that firms pick the optimal 
level of both types of energy, and households receive a potential profit from their dividend in the 
energy sector. While individuals rent their physical capital, firms decide what share needs to go 
to the production of final good, and which needs to invest in developing the required technology 
for producing clean energy. In the market-based approach, firms do not fully internalize the 
negative externalities risen from extracting and utilizing fossil fuel energy, as is the case in social 
planner framework. 
Therefore, based on the deviation of the results in the market-based approach from the social 
planner, I can introduce a cost element—such as carbon tax—which would be included in the 
firms’ profit function to capture negative externalities arising from environmental degradation. 
And in the next step, I can use this tax to finance the clean energy production, directly, without 
introducing the government section to see if the results converge with the social planner 
approach. If it does, I can propose a policy to promote the market approach analysis to mitigate 
the environmental problems in selecting the fossil fuel energy, without entering the government 
directly into the model. 
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Households 
There is one representative household15 for the whole economy who optimizes her utility 
based on her per capita consumption16 bundle, subject to budget constraint 26: 
Max⏟
Ct,Kt+1
= E0 ∑ β
t ct1−σ
1−σ
∞
t=0   ct =
Ct
Lt
⁄           (19&20) 
Ct + Kt+1 = wtLt + (1 + rt)Kt + πt        (21) 
In the above equation, wt is the labor’s wage, and πt is the gained profit from energy sector. 
Wage is the same across all sectors of the economy, which is perfectly mobile and substitutable 
labor. An individual can engage in two different sectors of the economy: in producing final good 
Y as PL; or, in developing new technology (AC) for producing clean energy. Either way, she 
earns the same compensation; therefore, I did not make any distinction in this section, but the 
firms can choose the final number. The household also compensates from renting her capital (K) 
to the market. She might receive some profit (π) from energy production sector as well. 
Populations grow according to equations, which has been developed in the social planner 
approach. We can think about the fertility model in which households are choosing the next 
period population based on the income level and the industrialization intensity in an economy.   
 Lt+1 = (1 + L̅)Lt   (If the population grows exogenously)   (22) 
Lt+1 = Lt + L0(
Yt
Lt
⁄ )ε1(
Lt
Kt
⁄ )ε2  (If the population grows endogenously)   (23) 
                                                          
15 One can think of the continuum of households who are identical in any aspect and characteristics. 
16 To be consistent to the social planner approach, per capita consumption has been considered. 
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Final good producers   
There are two types of firms in our setup: the firms who produce final good (Y)—in the 
perfectly competitive market—for the consumption given the production frontier, and the 
intermediary firms who provide two types of energy (fossil fuel-based and clean energy) in 
which they may earn a positive profit. Since all the firms in each sector are identical with the 
same production frontier, for simplification in the model, we can assume there is a single firm in 
each category. 
Yt = ED[AtKYt
αPLt
1−α−γ(CEt
ρ
+ FEt
ρ
)
𝛾
𝜌⁄ ]       (24) 
Et = [CEt
ρ
+ FEt
ρ
]
1
ρ⁄            
The final good producers are solving their profit maximization by: 
Max⏟
KYt,PLt,CEt,FEt
EDAtKYt
αPLt
1−α−γ(CEt
ρ
+ FEt
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ − wtPLt − (rt + δ)KYt − PFEtFEt − PCEtCEt 
            (25) 
In which PFE is the price of fossil fuel energy, and PCE is the price of clean energy. Damage 
function is also included to the production function, to be consistent to the planner approach for 
the comparability; however, the costs of pollution are not fully internalized by firms since ED is 
constant and does not depend on the rate of extraction of fossil fuel.   
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Energy producers 
In this sector, the firms are producing energy subject to the below optimization process: 
 Max⏟
TYt,TLt,ACt,FEt
βtπt              (26) 
in which  πt = PFEtFEt + PCEtCEt − wtTLt − rtTYt − CEXtFEt    (27)  
ACt+1 = AC0ACt
θ(TLtTYt)
ω  in which CEt = CE ∗ ACt       (28 & 29) 
To derive the cost of extraction of fossil fuel-based energy, we can use the previous setup 
from Equation 9. The rest of the equations—for the technological progress and the population—
are the same as the planner problem [(10), (11), (12) and (13)]. 
Solving the model 
To solve this model, I plan to take advantage of the same framework that I have used in the 
social planner approach. Therefore, I am going to set up the Lagrangians for the household, as 
are shown in Equation 30 and 31, and then solve the F.O.C.s for all the sectors (in Appendix I). 
Having the Euler equations, along with the initial and market clearing conditions, I am able to set 
up the dynamic system of equations to derive the growth paths for the desirable variables.  
ℒ = E0 ∑ [β
t
Ct
Lt
⁄
1−σ
1−σ
+ λ1t{Yt − Ct − Kt+1 + wtLt + (1 + rt)Kt + πt} +
t:1→∞
Ct,Kt+1,Lt+1
λ2t{(1 + L̅)Lt − Lt+1}] (Population is exogenous)     (30) 
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ℒ = E0 ∑ [β
t
Ct
Lt
⁄
1−σ
1−σ
+ λ1t{Yt − Ct − Kt+1 + wtLt + (1 + rt)Kt + πt} +
t:1→∞
Ct,Kt+1,Lt+1
λ2t {Lt + L0(
Yt
Lt
⁄ )ε1(
Lt
Kt
⁄ )ε2 − Lt+1}] (Population is endogenous)   (31) 
It is worth arguing that once firms do not fully internalize the negative externalities, the 
results in both social planner and market-based approaches are going to be different, as a 
fundamental distinction between the first best approach (social planner) and second best 
approach (market-based). There are also, at least, two other distinctions across these two setups. 
First, social planner chooses the optimal level of fossil fuel in each period; however households 
do not have that choice; firms select that level based on their expected profit, while there is no 
such a profit in social planner method. Second, households rent the total capital and earn interest 
rate, and then, firms decide what portion of that should be spent in clean energy, and what 
fraction should be invested in physical capital based on their optimality conditions. Whereas, in 
the other framework, social planner choose how much she should invest in physical capital and 
how much in clean energy. Thus, it is not the same process in decision making. As a result of 
these differences, one can see the law of motion for consumption in planner solution (Equation 
C34) is entirely different from the one in the decentralized model (Equation C25). Therefore, the 
F.O.C.s and results should not be identical in both cases, fundamentally and computationally.      
Results and Discussion 
In this section, first, I am going to compare different exogenous growth rates in both social 
planner and market-based frameworks. Then I plan to analyze the exogenous growth scenario to 
the endogenous one. 
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Social planner solution (different exogenous growth rates) 
The results are shown in Figure 1 when population grows exogenously with two different 
scenarios. In the first case, population grows by 0.02 percent every year. In the second, it 
increases by 0.6 percent per year, and it matches US population growth to some extent. We can 
see this difference affects the economic growth per capita slightly, and it changes the level of 
utilization of fossil fuel energy (higher for the higher growth rate in population). Higher rate of 
population growth means more laborers and researchers, therefore, more primary factors of 
production. However, more resources are needed to be utilized as well. While an economy 
produces more—and consequently, needs more energy and fossil fuel to use—in the higher 
population scenario, the economic growth per capita would be marginally lower because of the 
same argument. Therefore, not only with a higher rate of population, we do not experience a 
higher per capita growth rate in an economy, but also we spend more fossil fuel energy and 
degrade the environment more intensively.      
Social planner solution (exogenous versus endogenous growth) 
The results are depicted in Figure 2. Assuming the population adjusts itself through income 
and level of industrialization—given the endogenous population growth that is shown by the 
redlines in Figure 2—the economic growth per capita17 would be slightly lower compared to the 
exogenous scenario, while population growth across two models are in the same range. The 
capital increases in both cases, but at a higher rate, after several periods, if the population grows 
exogenously.  
                                                          
17 In another attempt in Appendix I, to better match the projected growth with the U.S. data over the next decades, I 
changed the capital share and reported the results. 
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I can argue that by the time we are running out of the fossil-fuel energy, the production 
process adapts itself, entirely using renewable energy as a primary energy factor18 (therefore, 
there would be no delay in energy provision). While this transition does not affect the economy 
in this setup since there would be no consecutive adverse impact of fossil fuel utilization on the 
production process. Thus, a negative impulse from transforming to the full utilization of clean 
energy would be neutralized by a positive inclination of not having negative externalities in the 
economy. 
Figure 2 shows us that if the population is considered exogenous, we conserve fossil fuel for a 
longer period, and utilize it less intensively compared to the endogenous scenario. If the 
population is tied to the income and level of industrialization, we utilize more fossil fuels and 
deplete non-renewable resources in a shorter time period. 
Market-based solution (exogenous versus endogenous growth) 
The results are depicted in Figure 3. The capital accumulation is higher in the exogenous 
scenario, as well as economic growth per capita. It is shown in Figure 3 that if the population is 
considered exogenous, we conserve fossil fuel for a shorter duration, and it reaches the 
maximum point of utilization sooner than in the endogenous scenario. If the population is tied to 
the income and level of industrialization, we utilize fewer fossil fuels and deplete non-renewable 
resources in a more extended period. The result of fossil fuel utilization contradicts the previous 
comparison in the social planner approach. However, the economic growth per capita is higher in 
the exogenous scenario compared to the endogenous scenario. 
                                                          
18 It might be a case, here, that dropping in provision of energy—at the time of running out of fossil fuel—would be 
offset by cutting the negative externalities from production process.   
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Planner’s problem vs. decentralized model (endogenous population) 
Solving the model, the results show that the economy per capita would grow at a slightly 
lower rate (around 0.07 percent yearly difference on average) in a centralized model relative to 
the decentralized model while population grows with a lower rate (around 0.05 percent on 
average in one hundred and eighty periods) in the latter framework; but, ultimately, the economic 
growth per capita in both frameworks converge to the same amount. The firms accumulate more 
capital and invest less in clean energy in the market-based solution compared to the social 
planner approach. Also, the return on physical capital is higher than the return on energy in the 
production function and makes it more attractive for firms to invest in the capital, not the clean 
energy. 
As is shown in Figure 4, in the planner’s solution, the fossil fuel resources would have been 
exhausted at a slower rate, and there would be a higher rate of adaptation of clean energy relative 
to the decentralized model. Despite the higher rate of energy consumption, the economic growth 
per capita is higher in the market-based solution because firms invest more on physical capital 
and use more fossil fuel compared to the planner who conserves fossil fuel for a longer period, 
and also the economy experiences a lower population growth rate in the decentralized model. 
The reason might be clear since firms do not adequately account for negative externalities that 
arise from non-renewable resource utilization. The other finding is that the population19 grows at 
a slightly higher rate in the planner’s solution compared to the decentralized model, in earlier 
periods. With the current parameterization, population growth does not match existing rates in 
                                                          
19 One would question that the depicted population is not realistic for the U.S. In Appendix I, I argue such issues.  
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the United States. However, in another attempt, I capture the current trend in population growth 
using alternative calibration for Equation 15 (endogenous population growth). 
Policy implication 
In this section, I try to investigate the situations in which the government imposes a regulation 
to converge the results in the market-based approach with the social planner approach in regard 
to the clean energy adaptation. An intervening party can set a rule in which every year a certain 
percentage of the total income needs to finance the production of clean energy without any direct 
interference from the government, so there is no need to enter the government spending and 
budget into the model. To do that, I can simply utilize the following assignment in which 
financing the clean energy (TY) is not a choice variable as it was in the previous setup; instead, it 
is a policy regulated by the government (or social planner):  
TYt+1 = TYt ∗ (1 + gTY)  in which gTY is the annual growth rate of TY   (32) 
In another attempt, I plan to propose two different methods (the second method is described in 
Appendix I) to include environmental erosion in the firms’ cost-benefit analysis. To do that, I 
added an element of cost—which can be thought of as a carbon-tax factor—to the firms' energy 
profit maximization process, to internalize the cost of degrading the environment. Here, I am 
going to use Equation 6 [EDt = 1 − (
FEt
φ⁄ )
ϑ] which states that the environment degrades as 
more fossil fuel is being used. Thus, the profit function 27 would be: 
πt = PFEtFEt + PCEtCEt − wtTLt − rtTYt − CEXtFEt − SCt    (33)  
where: SCt = PSCt ∗ (1 − EDt) → PSCt ∗ (
FEt
φ⁄ )
ϑ     (34) 
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in which PSC is the price of eroding the environment and set by the social planner. Now, we 
can set the social cost in a way that the economic growth (or the total welfare) in the market-
based model would converge to the one in the social planner solution by making the firm’s profit 
equal to zero. We might call that price the optimal taxation policy on carbon emission. The 
results are shown in Figures 5-A. 
There are three issues within this profit-tax framework, which need to be clarified. The first 
issue is the profit’s existence in this model. Since the cost of extraction (CEX) is derived 
exogenously in this model, it allows the cost of fossil fuel-based energy to be lower than the 
revenue. Hence, the profit element can be evolved in this framework. The second issue is the 
impact of taxation on firms’ decision. The assumption, here, is that firms can earn positive profit 
only if they extract and sell fossil fuel energy. Therefore, taxing their profit does not change their 
decision to shift their production toward clean energy, since producing clean energy is not 
profitable. The last issue involves a characteristic of the tax itself. The proposed tax is not 
exactly Pigouvian tax since it is not directly imposed on using fossil fuel energy, but on the profit 
which firms’ earn from selling that energy. The idea, here, is not to limit or impact the firms’ 
production decision by taxing the provision of fossil fuel energy but to channel the extra 
resources generating from that provision to boost up clean energy utilization.             
Figure 5-B indicates that imposing a carbon tax element on fossil fuel production can bring 
back the market-based approach to the social planner solution. Figure 5-C shows that imposing 
the environmental costs of utilizing fossil fuel energy can limit the production in a similar way to 
the social planner approach. However, charging this tax does not increase the investment in the 
adaptation of clean energy advancement. Also, imposing the tax slows the utilization of fossil 
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fuel energy but not in line with the social planner’s solution. Figure 5-A shows the optimum tax 
ratio while fossil fuel resources are being used to produce energy. 
Figure 5-A shows the fossil fuel utilization—per peta watt hour—and the dollar tax rate per 
kilowatt hour of energy production using fossil fuel resources (which is around one cent per 
kilowatt hour). As has been shown before, the results in both scenarios (endogenous vs. 
exogenous population growth) do not vary having both sources of energy, but they differ when 
running out of non-renewable energy. In order to have the optimal taxation policy on fossil fuel 
utilization, we need to impose a U-shape taxation system which begins with the rate decreasing 
as firms use fossil fuels more intensively, and then increases when firms earn more profit. 
Given the results in Figure 5-C, by regulating the market—imposing the investment rule in 
clean energy production—we can limit production but this regulation slightly increases the utility 
of individuals in a way that converges the results to the social planner approach. However—as a 
tradeoff—it causes a slower future capital accumulation. The results for the first policy 
implication show that such a policy would be ineffective. 
Welfare analysis  
Here, I intend to compare the effects of different model specifications (such as social planner 
vs. market-based approach) on the total welfare of the society, which can be seen as the 
utilitarian welfare function where all individuals have the same weight for the social planner over 
the horizon time discounted to the present value. Following Floden (2001), I am going to 
introduce the utilitarian welfare gain of model specification change as below:  
W = ∑ βtU(c(t))Tt=0           (35) 
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Consider that the premium WG (compensating variation) can be thought of as the percent of 
consumption of individuals in economy B in each period, who need to be compensated in order 
to give up living in condition A, and move to economy B, which can be interpreted as the below 
equality: 
∑ βtUA(c(t))
T
t=0 = ∑ β
tUB((1 + WG)c(t))
T
t=0       (36) 
Substituting the utility function, we are going to have: 
∑ βt
cAt
1−σ
1−σ
T
t=0 = ∑ β
t (cBt∗(1+𝑊𝐺))
1−σ
1−σ
T
t=0        (37) 
Rearrange it for WG, and substitute back the welfare function, we get: 
WG = (
WA
WB
)
1/1−σ
− 1         (38) 
Using Equation 38—while WA is the welfare in the social planner solution, and WB is the 
welfare in the market-based approach—there is a loss in the welfare of the society of 0.033 if we 
try to move away from the centralized to the decentralized model, if population grows 
endogenously. It means in order to maintain the same level of consumption in a social planner, 
we need to compensate households for about three percent of their consumption in a 
decentralized model. This compensation amount, for the exogenous case, seems to be around the 
same amount of compensation between two different frameworks (3.3 percent versus 2.8 
percent). However, this difference is about fifteen percent, considering an endogenous 
population growth instead of exogenous20. The results aligns with the previous findings in which 
                                                          
20 The magnitude of this difference, considering the current US GDP, is around ninety billions of dollars per year.   
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social planner is the first best and market-based is the second, if firms do not fully internalize the 
negative externalities.  
Undertaking the same process for the market-based model using different policies, we get the 
following results. Setting the time path for 180 years, there would be a negligible loss for no 
policy vs. policy-1. By applying the first policy, which was setting a rule in which the firms need 
to increase the financing of the clean energy production by five percent annually21, there would 
be no gain and a small loss. By applying the second policy—which is the carbon-tax method—
the gain would be more than two percent of consumption. Taxing the fossil fuel energy slightly 
influences the welfare. At the same time, it affects the future welfare while the production 
process is utilizing one hundred percent clean energy as a resource. Therefore, by imposing a tax 
on fossil fuel consumption, we can improve the total utility of the households in the long-run. 
The summary of compensating variations across different models is reported in Table 3. 
Including endogeneity of population growth in any similar model shapes the future growth 
path and is twofold. First, we are overestimating the future growth path with any scale since we 
have not considered the feedback loop from the system to population itself (three percent 
difference on average in this framework). Second, in any decentralized economy, firms tend to 
utilize more resources to produce more. They ignore the negative externalities that arise from a 
production process. Because of this, there should be policy (preferably a carbon-tax tool) to 
improve the society’s welfare. In this setup, seven percent of the consumption per year is a 
considerable amount—even as a higher bound—not to avoid the negative externalities existence 
that follows from fossil fuel energy use.  
                                                          
21 I can increase that percentage, but it makes the model unstable after a few periods.  
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Conclusion      
I proposed a dynamic growth model that allows for the interaction between an economy and 
an environment, utilizing both a social planner framework and decentralized method. Having no 
fossil fuel left, treating population endogenously leads to slightly lower growth in the economy 
relative to the exogenous population growth during the hundred percent renewable energy 
utilization. This result is rational in a sense that when population grows exogenously, any 
changes in the income level of households do not affect the growth rate in a population, which is 
a primary factor of production, itself. However, when we tie the population to the income level 
and other factors of the model, using a feedback loop, then any fluctuation in those factors 
directly impacts the population growth (and economic growth as a result). Switching from fossil 
fuel energy would not cause a drop in economic growth, since it would neutralized the positive 
impulse from removing the damage function that arises from fossil fuel utilization. Therefore, 
there would be a smooth transition from using both sources of energy to just renewable energy.  
In the market-based approach, firms tend to utilize fossil fuel energy in a shorter period and 
invest more in clean energy, as opposed to the social planner method. Implementing a carbon-tax 
element on firms who produce energy speeds up adaptation of clean energy, and increases 
households’ satisfaction due to the long-run higher rate of consumption, and recovers the partial 
loss that has been imposed by moving away from the first best scenario.  
The long-run economic growth per capita converges to two percent in the current setup in 
which there is an exogenous technology with the growth rate of one point five percent. This 
result is opposite to the previous ones since growth in an economy is proportionate to growth in 
exogenous elements. Based on current findings, it is essential to include the endogeneity of the 
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population in an economy since it prohibits any overestimation in growth prediction. The 
developed framework also allows for distinguishing the gap between a social planner and a 
market-based approach, and positives and negatives of each method regarding the projection of 
the growth path.  
The future focus should be on expanding an idea of entering energy consumption 
heterogeneity into the current setup based on the availability of resources and different marginal 
costs of producing energy. On the other hand, households might not have a unique preference 
toward energy exploitation that can affect their energy consumption. Considering these sources 
of heterogeneity, a follow-up paper might lead to a different conclusion than I have investigated 
so far, which can lead to different policy recommendations than those I have already suggested.  
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II. Having skin in the energy game: The Impact of Social Norms on Energy Regime 
Changes 
Introduction 
Over the past three decades, concern about energy conservation has increased, mainly for 
environmental reasons such as urban air pollution and the threat of climate change. Energy forms 
are not all alike in their environmental impacts. Burning coal contributes more to urban air 
pollution than burning natural gas (Stern, 1992). Therefore, reforming energy resources is vital 
concerning environmental complication such as air and water pollutions. Since moving away 
from nonrenewable cheap energy is costly, there should be a strong motivation to change 
individuals’ preferences to accept and pay the associated costs of energy adaptation. Social 
norms are one of the interventions that are commonly used in energy context to influence support 
for changes in environmentally friendly behavior (Steg, 2008; Allcott, 2011).      
Social norms play an essential role in shaping how people interpret and compare behavior 
(Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2003; Cialdini, 2003). Social norms are the rules or group-based standards 
regarding appropriate behaviors and attitudes (Schultz et al. 2007). The validity of social norms 
has been used in both economics and psychology studies. The effectiveness of descriptive social 
norms has been observed in pro-environmental behaviors, including energy and water 
conservation (Brager & Dear, 1998; and Jessoe & Rapson, 2014). Ferraro and Price (2013) use 
the average water usage of each neighborhood (as a social comparison) to induce households—
of the same neighborhood—to decrease their consumption. One of the most important methods 
that has impacted individuals is through collective action, such as support for public policies and 
social movements to reduce greenhouse gasses through making financial contributions to social 
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movements, voting, and signing petitions (Clayton et al. 2015). In their analysis, Minton and 
Rose (1997) indicate the effects of injunctive norms on the individuals’ behaviors such as 
signing a petition to support an environmental cause, willingness to pay more taxes or money for 
electricity to support greater government control of pollution. 
Any legislative approach to carbon emission will not fully recover the global warming crisis. 
However, Avi-Yonah and Uhlmann (2009) argue that a carbon tax can be a proper response to 
climate change through the necessary reductions in carbon emissions. Metcalf and Weisbach 
(2008) believe that a well-designed carbon tax might capture around eighty percent of the US 
emissions. However, a carbon tax is likely to be highly regressive which would put the burden on 
the bottom income decile compared to the top decile. Recent Canadian experience in British 
Columbia with carbon taxation approved the effectiveness of such policy in the reduction of the 
carbon emission (Harrison, 2012). Minton and Rose (1997) show that people intend to pay more 
taxes to support environmentally friendly policies. On the other hand, Alcott (2011) argues that 
there are several issues in regards to carbon taxation and clean energy subsidy. He believes that it 
has not been politically feasible to implement Pigouvian carbon tax. And while subsidies are in 
theory harmless, since they are transfers, they consume noticeable public funds in practice. 
In the current exploratory study, I examine the impact of social norms on supporting for 
environmental policy in the energy reform context using survey analysis. More specifically, I 
provide various types of information for the respondents about the renewable and nonrenewable 
energy consumption rates. This information is going to be the percentage of renewable energy 
use, at the national level, in the US compared to the European countries and China. The survey 
for the control group asks whether the respondents are willing to sign a petition—adapting clean 
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energy resources and moving away from fossil fuel energy—without providing the national 
comparison energy information. Then I ask the individuals the same question but with an 
additional information; this time the data comparing energy consumption in the US, EU 
countries and China are provided for them as a descriptive norm. After that, I verify if supplying 
different energy information sets affects their behavior supporting the petition. In the end, I ask 
the respondents who support the petition what type of taxation they prefer to subsidize clean 
energy: a carbon tax on energy producers or an increase in sales tax. 
This research diverges from previous literature in two ways: first, the outcome of this study is 
driven based on the voluntary individual support for collective regulation rather than voluntary 
individual behavior changes; and the second, descriptive norm is framed at a group level rather 
than an individual level which has not been explored previously. While most of the research in 
the literature look for any changes at the household level and individuals’ behavior, investigating 
the impact of descriptive social norms on collective actions using petition signing has been in a 
few studies such as Margetts et al. (2009) and Liu et al. (2016) in energy conservation context. 
Those studies emphasize using the same type of energy more efficiently, not switching to 
another energy. Another contribution of this study is that in the design petition, the households 
are asked to subsidize the renewable energy production either by paying higher sale tax rates by 
themselves or imposing a carbon tax on the energy producers. The intuition behind offering two 
tax policies is to verify whether the individuals are willing to bear the cost of subsidy directly by 
themselves or indirectly through the future energy prices.    
The results show that providing the information about energy consumption of different 
countries has an impact on individuals’ decisions. However, these effects are not always that we 
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expect them to be. When the participants were informed about the energy utilization in China 
compared to the US—where China utilizes more fossil fuel energy than the US—they are more 
likely to sign the petition on the energy reform to move away from fossil fuel and invest more in 
clean energy. On the other hand, they are less likely to engage when they were notified about the 
European energy usage where those countries generates a higher percentage of clean energy 
compared to the US.     
This paper is designed as follows: in the next section, the experimental design will be 
discussed, followed by the data description; in Section IV, the results of the study will be 
presented and discussed; in Section V, a power analysis for the future experimental design based 
on the results of this pilot study will be provided; in the end, a short conclusion will be 
examined; the survey itself would be displayed in Appendix II. 
Experimental Method 
I designed a petition (as a survey study), calling for energy reform, moving away from fossil-
based energy to renewables—such as the wind, hydro, solar, nuclear and thermal energy. This 
would be funded by either an increase in sales tax by one percent to subsidize fossil-based 
energy producers to adopt other technology or charging fossil-based energy producers with the 
carbon tax (ten percent), and then subsidizing the producers who want to generate other energy 
sources. 
The experimental method includes four petitions (one control group and three treatment 
groups). I have designed four survey links for four groups. Since the approved target population 
is twelve thousand faculty, staff, and students at Georgia State University, I randomly assigned 
38 
 
three thousand to each group—prior sending out the surveys—in such a way that six thousand 
would be randomly selected from the faculty and staff pool, and six thousands from the students’ 
pool. In the survey, after asking some basic information such as gender, income level, native or 
non-native to the US, and occupation, I provided the information about the effect of the carbon 
emission on the environment and human lives, including the carbon reduction by switching 
energy-based fuels. 
The survey contains the energy usage—based on types—in the US at the national level. More 
than eighty percent of the US energy consumption is supplied by fossil-based energy, which 
produces more than 15 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide. The forests required to sequester 
the produced carbon every year in the US is more than 15 times of the existing forests in the US. 
Carbon emissions from coal are about 25 times more than solar PV to produce the same amount 
to generate electricity; and more than double about natural gas; and still around one-fifth of the 
total energy produces by coal because it is marginally cheaper and available, excluding the 
environmental damages it causes. 
The US uses more fossil fuel than European countries, but less than China. Therefore, by 
providing the energy information about the countries who are utilizing more clean energy 
compared to the US, I hoped to nudge households to support for clean energy adaptation. Thus, 
in the first treatment, I added the comparison between European countries and the United States 
as a descriptive norm in which the US uses about 82 percent of her energy from fossil fuel 
resources, while this number is around 45 percent for European countries. The second norm is 
the comparison between the US and China, while China allocates 89 percent fossil fuel-based 
resources to cover her energy needs. Since China uses more fossil-based energy, it might be 
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useful to verify the possible downturn effect of the social norm; in this case, people might think 
there is another country which is worse when concerning the environment. Participants would 
ask: “why should we care?” And the third is the comparison between the US, European 
countries, and China, all together, to verify the impact of the full exposure of the information. At 
the end of the petition, I asked participants if they are willing to sign the petition or not; if they 
agreed to sign, then I would follow with another question, asking whether they prefer sales tax 
increment or carbon tax reform on fossil-based energy producers to cover the costs. While the 
first treatment would directly affect the household’s costs, the latter increases individual’s living 
costs indirectly.  
The purpose of this design is to test two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is whether providing 
additional information on country energy consumption—as a descriptive norm—can influence 
the households’ decision to support a petition in favor of clean energy. The second hypothesis is 
having the households’ support for subsidizing the clean energy, how should legislators proceed 
to provide the required resources for such subsidy—by imposing a carbon tax on energy 
producers which indirectly impact the consumers’ consumption prices, or increasing a sales tax 
which directly affects the prices. I speculate that the respondents would choose the carbon tax 
rather than the sales tax since they comprehend the immediate price effect. I think it would be 
crucial if the subjects believe that it is not a hypothetical survey and have actual impacts. 
Therefore, I included a paragraph in the petition that states that I plan to submit the outcome of 
this petition to Governor Deal. Since there is a high-cost associated with the petition, I thought 
that less likely people would sign it. This assumption gives me a powerful tool (since subjects 
realized that engaging this activity comes with the costs) to identify the effectiveness of the 
social behavior. The survey is shown in Appendix II.  
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Data 
Table 7 shows the summary statistics of the collected data. All the variables in the table are 
categorical but income and age. Around 730 subjects started the survey; however, only 91% of 
them completed the study and responded to the central question (Will you sign the petition in 
either case?), leaving a total of 665 respondents which might not be sufficient for the analysis. 
We can see that only thirty percent of the participants are students, which shows that the 
majority of the subjects might participate in the household decision making process since the 
average income of the respondents (around fifty three thousands of dollars) is close to the US 
average income and the median age (40) is close to the US median age (38). However, half of the 
participants hold a degree higher than a Bachelor’s degree which is not the case for the US 
population on average. At least sixty percent of the subjects were married once; and the same 
percentage of the participants are female.  
In general, slightly more than two-thirds of the respondents agreed to sign the petition in favor 
of the study. Less than one-third of them chose to bear the associated costs of investing in clean 
energy by themselves paying the extra sales tax to cover the expenses. There are a balanced 
number of respondents between all the groups but the third. The third group—in which the 
energy data between the US and China has been compared—had about one-third more 
participants than the average of the other pools together. Evidently, there are no meaningful 
differences between the summary statistics of the total respondent and the ones who selected into 
petition signing.  
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Results and discussion 
Table 7 shows the core results of the research. Only six percent of the subjects who received 
the recruiting email responded to the survey (728 out of 12,000). And from this pool, ninety-one 
percent of them have finished the survey (665 out of 728). The number of the respondents who 
started the survey, and then completed it, are displayed in Table 7 in total and each group. 
Treatment 1 refers to the group who were informed about the energy consumption comparison 
between the US and European countries. Treatment 2 refers to the group who were informed 
about the energy consumption comparison between the US and China. And Treatment 3 refers to 
the group who were informed about the energy consumption comparison between the US, China, 
and European countries.  
The results of the two tax proposal are documented in Table 7. We can see more than seventy-
two percent of the individuals supported for the carbon tax, not the sales tax. It shows that the 
individuals are more likely to sign up for an environmental policy if it would not put any direct 
burden on them. In a separate attempt, I tried to verify the possible correlation between the 
respondents’ characteristics and their decisions to sign the petition having the randomized 
dataset, while the main treatment analysis is also included. Table 8 shows the results of the 
Probit regression, where the dependent binary variable is either sign the petition or not. I dropped 
the individuals’ income in the third column for two reasons: the first reason is the 
multicollinearity between the income and the respondents’ education; the second is to not losing 
about sixteen percent of the data since just five hundred and fifty of the subjects have reported 
their income. I included the number of kids as a proxy for the cost of living and possible control 
for the income and any other backdoor correlation. 
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When the subjects asked to sign the petition, only 62.6 percent agreed to do such. However, 
more of the respondents opposed the idea of signing the petition just after the comparison of the 
energy utilization between the US versus European countries22 was shown to them. This means 
the subjects responded negatively to the presented norm (the energy comparison between the US 
and EU). This outcome contradicts the previous findings in which consumers were more likely to 
act in favor of energy conservation, in an environmentally friendly manner. It is worth 
mentioning that singing the petition would be costly for the respondents in the future, since 
subsidizing clean energy requires resources. The individuals were informed that there are two 
channels to cover the costs: increasing the consumers’ sales tax (which impacts them directly) or 
imposing a carbon tax on fossil fuel energy producers (which might affect them indirectly 
because energy producers may raise the prices). While the mentioned conclusion would be too 
strong based on the under power analysis—which is shown in Table 8—among control group 
and the first treatment group (the US versus European countries), it is noteworthy that there are 
two fundamental differences between this finding and the previous ones.  
First, the social norm used here is at the national level, not for the people within a specific 
country. Individuals had different understandings and views about other countries prior to doing 
the survey. These realizations might have caused participants to form a judgment call when they 
made a comparison between their country and others. And if the information they were about to 
see would not have aligned with their judgments, the results might not have lined up with what 
one would expected. Align with this claim, Edwards (1968) showed that people are failing to 
revise their prior beliefs to absorb new information according to the Bayes’ theory. Similarly, 
                                                          
22 Where EU countries use a higher percentage of their energy as the renewable resources compared to the US 
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Lord et al. (1979) confirmed that strong beliefs are more likely resistant to alter even in the face 
of a thorough discrediting of their evidential basis. 
The second primary differences in this study compared to its priors is that switching from 
fossil fuel energy to clean energy is costly; whereas, by conserving the energy—which is the 
case for the previous studies—the consumers benefit financially. These two distinctions may be 
the reasons for such differences between the current and previous studies. 
In another comparison, when the subjects were given the energy information about the US 
versus China, they reacted differently. It is interesting that China utilizes more fossil fuel energy 
compared to the US in percentage, and I expected that either it negatively impacted their decision 
or nothing would have happened at all. Surprisingly, the attendants responded positively to this 
norm, and more people agreed to sign up for the petition. It seems that the respondents have 
already formed such a robust perception about the US-China comparison that aligned them in 
favor of the survey. They wanted this gap between the US and China energy utilization to 
continuously grow. In my perspective, the most compelling verdict of this study is the result of 
the first norm (US-EU) and the second norm (US-China). In both scenarios, the subjects were 
partially informed23; in such a comparison, one can see the power of the misdirection of the 
information. By not fully exposing the facts about the energy consumption of all the available 
countries to the subjects, one may orient individuals’ decision to the favorable direction.  
Table 8 confirms that the only positive and statistically significant outcome is when the 
respondents were informed about the energy consumption comparison between the US and 
                                                          
23 Based on the design of this study, where the comparison among the US, EU, and China are considered the full 
information scenario.  
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China. If the second norm (the US vs. China) is presented to a respondent, there is forty-two 
percent more chance that she signs the petition compared to the control group. The third 
treatment—which is the full information state—is also positive but not significant; there is 
twenty-two percent more chance that a respondent signs the petition relative to the control group. 
And as it has been discussed before, the subjects adversely reacted when they learned about the 
energy consumption in the US and European countries; the magnitude of such conclusion is still 
negative while it is not significant. In this case, there is twenty-one percent less chance that a 
respondent does not sign the petition compared to the control group.  
The analysis for the characteristics of the subjects shows that as the subjects become more 
educated, they are more likely—but not statistically significant—to care about the consequences 
of the energy production on the environment such as air pollution. The same argument can be 
driven looking at the occupation variable. It is more intriguing to see that when the respondents 
are getting older, they become less responsible for the environment or are more self-interested. 
This argument can be rationalized if one thinks about the consequences of older individuals, who 
are more likely to be closer to the end of their life than younger individuals. As a result, they 
may not prioritize evaluating the feasible environmental consequences of the energy utilization 
such as climate change and air pollution, in a way that younger generations do. The analysis on 
the type of taxation does not reveal any information about the characteristics of the respondents 
to either tax policies, as it is shown in Table 9. 
Future experimental design 
Based on the results of the current pilot study, now we can take a further step to perform a 
relevant power analysis to compute the required sample size for such experiment with two 
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treatment groups and a control group. Table 10 shows the power analysis of the different 
comparisons among the three survey groups (C shows the control group, and T1-2 are for the 
different treatment groups). Power analysis in an experiment can determine how large a sample 
size should be to give us a reliable statistical judgment, and how likely we can detect the impacts 
within that given sample. The total sample displays the number of the required respondents in 
both compared groups. The alpha (α) represents the Type I error, and the power shows the one 
minus Type II error (1-β) in this statistical test.  
In this analysis, the percentage of the respondents in the control group who would sign the 
petition is considered 62 %; while the amount is 55% for the first treatment (energy comparison 
between the US versus EU countries), and 77% for the second treatment (energy comparison 
between the US and China). Table 10 displays that to detect a significant difference between the 
control group and the first treatment, we need a large sample size which is not easy to get in a 
survey study. However, we have a better chance to discover any differences in other pairwise 
comparisons. The below is the formula that the sample size in Table 10 is built on which is one-
way ANOVA pairwise analysis: 
𝑛 = (𝑝𝑎(1 − 𝑝𝑎) + 𝑝𝑏(1 − 𝑝𝑏))(
𝑧1−𝛼/2𝜏+𝑧1−𝛽
𝑝𝑎−𝑝𝑏
)2  
𝑧 =
𝑝𝑎 − 𝑝𝑏
√𝑝𝑎(1 − 𝑝𝑎)
𝑛 +
𝑝𝑏(1 − 𝑝𝑏)
𝑛
 
in which: 
n is the sample size; α is the type I error; β is the type two error (so 1-β is the power); and τ is 
the number of the comparisons to be made which is 3 in this calculation.  
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Conclusion 
I designed a field experiment, using a survey analysis, to identify the possible impact of the 
social norms on the individuals’ decisions to support a petition in an environmental-energy 
context. In the survey, the subjects were asked whether to sign the petition or not, to change the 
energy utilization pattern and invest more in clean energy production. I used the energy 
consumption information from the United States, China, and European countries to form three 
separate comparisons as the social norms. In the end, I proposed two different tax policies and 
asked the respondents which they are willing to support.  
The results show that while initially, less than sixty-three percent of the respondents were 
willing to sign up for the energy reform, more of the subjects would agree to do so when the 
information about the US-China energy usage was provided. The outcome of this research 
revealed that we can use a social norm as an influential tool in an energy reform context to 
increase individuals’ support in an environmentally friendly policy. Moving away from fossil 
fuel based-energy and utilizing more clean energy, not only may help to restore the environment 
by a reduction in negative externalities arise from fossil fuel energy use, but also it can slow 
down the climate change by a contraction in carbon emission. This effort can also be used in a 
policy context in which achieving a super majority is needed. The respondents are more likely to 
support the carbon tax on energy producers to subsidize clean energy rather than an increase in 
the sales tax. 
This research was performed at the university level—where respondents achieved a higher 
education compared to the average individuals in the US. A possible extension of this work 
could be a field experiment executed outside a university campus, where subjects’ educational 
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attainment would not be upwardly biased, and therefore, the results would be a better prediction 
of the society’s aggregate understandings and willingness to participate in environmentally 
friendly reforms. Another challenge that should be taken into account in a similar future study is 
that a survey must design in such a way that can isolate any respondents’ prior beliefs about the 
compared countries versus US, to unbiasedly determine any treatment effects that arise from 
providing new information on energy concepts. Including a question referring to the political 
party affiliation may help in that regard.       
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III. Energy Fallout: Air Pollution Effects on Environmental and Social Externalities 
Introduction 
Every year millions of people die because of the problems regarding air pollution across the 
globe24. There is also strong causal evidence connecting climatic events to human conflict over 
all the main regions of the world (Hsiang et al. 2013). In addition, air pollution has long-term 
effects on physical and mental health, which may encourage unprecedented illegal behaviors. 
Identifying the causes of criminal activity and mortality—which I call social damages in this 
research—are vital in compelling legislators to control and shift their effects by taking actions 
that can adequately address these concerns—specifically, in this study, air pollution for affected 
regions. On the other hand, air pollution is a result of human activities and is mostly generated 
utilizing fossil fuel-based energy.  
Hanlon (2015) shows that industrial pollution had a substantial effect on the mortality rates 
during the nineteenth century. Anderson (2016) also finds the similar impact on the elderly in 
recent years. Heutel and Ruhm (2016) disclose a positive relationship between mortality rates 
and pollutants such as carbon monoxide, ozone, and particulate matter. The impacts of air 
pollution on health outcomes have been studied thoroughly (Folinsbee, 1993; Kunzli et al. 2000; 
Pope et al. 2002). Kampa and Castanas (2008) claim that air pollution has severe impacts on 
human health. Air pollution then influences different organs and systems causing conditions such 
as bronchitis in adults and lung cancer, asthmatic attacks, and heart-related issues. 
                                                          
24 The Global Burden of Disease from Air Pollution; AAAS 2016 Annual Meeting, Washington, DC. 
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Air pollution may also affect criminal activities, directly or indirectly. Cohn (1990) discusses 
the theoretical background and verifies the influence of different weather conditions on various 
types of criminal behavior. Masters et al. (1998) explore the hypothesis that absorption of 
neurotoxic metals may be partly responsible for the extremely high and widely varying crime 
rates in the United States. In the study most closely related to this research, Herrnstadt and 
Muehlegger (2015) apply data on two million illegal activities reported to the Chicago police 
department in a twelve-year interval. Consistent with evidence from psychology on the 
correlation between pollution and aggression, the impact is unique to violent crimes; they could 
not find any effect of contamination on property crime. 
There is a possible causation between household income levels and a higher likelihood of 
illegal activity (Viscusi, 1986; Freeman, 1987; Grogger, 1998; Weinberg, et al., 2002). There is 
also a rich body of literature examining the association between population density and the 
prevalence of crime (Sacerdote & Glaeser, 1999; McDonald & McMillen 2010). Glaeser (1996) 
and Sun, et al. (2004) claim that property rates can influence crime rates. Air pollution can affect 
individuals’ income (Selden & Song, 1994; Carson et al. 1997), housing values (Ridker & 
Henning, 1967; Anderson & Crocker, 1971), and city size (Grimm et al. 2008). Therefore, it 
might arouse criminal activity indirectly via these factors. Thus, I can build a bridge from 
criminal activity via air pollution that arises from energy consumption.  
The purpose of this study is to estimate the impact of energy consumption—making a 
distinction between fossil fuel energy and clean energy25—on reported crimes and mortality 
through the air pollution channel, using the mechanism approach. Given the existing correlation 
                                                          
25 In this study, clean energy refers to the solar, hydro, wind, nuclear and biofuel energies. 
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between air pollution and criminal activity, and previous studies limited to particular 
neighborhoods, the challenge is to verify whether the results are generalizable and confirm 
causation. The use of cheap energy, such as coal or gas, leads to higher air pollution than clean 
energy, such as solar and wind; however, implementing cheaper energy decreases the production 
costs, and therefore, more production, which results in higher income. Given the high correlation 
between income and criminal activity, higher income leads to a lower rate of illegal activities, 
and at the same time higher living standards lead to lower mortality rates, while using clean 
energy has an adverse effect through the production/income channel. Accordingly, there is a 
trade-off between using cheap fossil fuel energy and more expensive and clean energy, in which 
both types of energy may decrease the social damages: the first one through higher production 
rates, and the second one through lower air pollution. Ultimately, the answer of which method 
may reduce both criminal activity and mortality is an empirical question which is pursued in the 
current research.    
I use state-level data from all available states across the US, whereas in previous 
investigations, authors usually have used data specific to one or few regions (Herrnstadt & 
Muehlegger, 2015; Anderson, 2016; Liu, 2017). Thus, the idea is that the external validity of 
their results might not be generalizable across the US—given the internal validity is reliable. 
While data used in the previous findings is daily and identifies the short-term effects pollution 
has on crime, I benefit from the yearly data to determine the long-term effect of air pollution on 
reported crime. Given the possible existence of the omitted variables and endogeneity at the state 
level, I utilize Oster's (2017) method to control for the selection of an unobservable variable to 
account for unforeseen problems. And in other attempt, I utilize political affiliations of the 
governors of each state as an instrument for an additional robustness check. It must take into 
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account that the political affiliation might not be a valid instrument since the exclusion restriction 
is hard to believe.  
I set up an empirical model—using mechanism approach—to verify the impact of air 
pollution on crime and mortality rates, given the current trade-offs of energy adoption and 
production/income level. Air pollution has been shown to affect a variety of outcomes—
including crime and mortality—but air pollution partially comes from energy use, and that 
energy use affects crime and mortality through other mechanisms such as income. Thus, a more 
comprehensive empirical analysis would be to examine the causal effect of energy use on crime 
and mortality, and estimate the countervailing mechanism effects that come via pollution and via 
income. Given the results, the contribution of this work is that air pollution escalates both violent 
crimes and mortality rates caused by fossil fuel energy consumption. At the same time, as the use 
of fossil fuel-based energy rises, income tends to increase while both mortality rates and criminal 
activities decrease. The empirical results can confirm that as the air becomes more polluted, the 
likelihood of a rise in crime in that neighborhood increases as a result, as does mortality induced 
by fossil fuel energy. Accordingly, there is a trade-off between using cheaper, contaminated 
energy (which leads to more production), and utilizing cleaner, expensive energy and polluting 
less (which leads to less production).   
This paper is formatted as follows: in the next section, I adopt an empirical model, utilizing 
the mechanism approach to distinguish the correlations among the drivers of violent illicit 
activity and mortality, followed by a description of the extracted data in the successive section; 
then, I analyze the possible correlations among the different variables, discuss the results and 
possible rival explanations for the proposed analysis’ limitations, and take advantage of an 
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instrumental variable (IV) approach; and in the end, I perform a comprehensive analysis to 
authenticate the validity of the outcomes. To do this, I take advantage of the Oster (2017) method 
for selection of observable variables on unobserved, as well as a sensitivity analysis, followed by 
a conclusion. 
Empirical model 
Figure 10 shows declining trends for the air pollution as a negative externality, total reported 
crimes, and mortality rate over the studied period, while the total use of fossil fuel-based energy 
relative to the total energy consumption has had a negative direction as well26. Given the impact 
of economic activities on air pollution, and the possible effect of the latter on crime rates and 
mortality through channels such as health outcomes or educational quality, I build my model in 
which energy utilization is the independent variable, and the crime rates and mortality rates are 
the dependent variables. Production (total income as a proxy) has a negative impact on illicit 
activities (Hansen & Machin, 2002), while at the same time might have a positive effect on the 
illegal endeavors via air pollution. Therefore, the critical question is whether the overall impact 
of the energy used in production has an effect on crime rates and mortality considering both 
direct and indirect effects (via air pollution) in the US. 
Figure 11 displays a summarized identification strategy as a flowchart. It is shown that energy 
use affects both air pollution and income at the same time, while these two influence the latent 
variables (criminal activities and mortality rates). Within this structure, there are other control 
variables that interact with the key variables of the study (independent variable, dependent 
variables, and the mechanisms) at the same time. It is also depicted that there is a reverse 
                                                          
26 Data description is explained in the following section 
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causality between income and energy use which can bias the results. Another challenge I am 
facing is that crime might have a reverse effect on production (the same as air pollution). And 
also, higher income level can impact environmental policy. Therefore, finding a key factor, 
which has a high correlation with production (and air pollution), but not criminal activity, is 
vital. 
To address such an issue, I employ energy consumption, based on state-level data retrievable 
from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA). Air pollution is a direct effect of energy 
consumption; therefore energy can be a powerful explanatory variable for air pollution. 
However, energy use is a primary factor of production, so it is connected to criminal activity 
indirectly. Therefore, air pollution is not the only channel that connects energy consumption to 
crime and mortality, but rather production/income also makes the same connection. To verify 
this hypothesis, I apply the mechanism effect approach. I implement Imai et al. (2010) for the 
mechanism approach. The key to understanding the mechanism effect is the following 
counterfactual inquiry: how would the outcome differ if one were to alter the mediator from the 
control condition value to the treatment condition value while maintaining the treatment status at 
the same level? However, identifying the treatments of mechanism via control conditions is hard 
to detect since this study is built on a multi-valued treatment and multi-valued mechanism.  
To measure the mechanism effect, I first verify the impact of energy consumption on the 
dependent variable: violent crime rates and mortality rates (Equation 1). Then, I measure the 
incidence of energy (fossil fuel and clean, separately) on the proposed mechanisms: air pollution 
and production (Equation 2). Last, I estimate the original model (including all the proposed 
variables) (Equation 3). Therefore, these equations are estimated separately, at different steps. It 
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is important to note that the variation in the current analysis comes from the states’ government. 
Each state, based on the availability of natural resources and geographical condition, chooses the 
type of the energy that optimizes the level of production and prosperity.  
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑖 + 𝛿1𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑1𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡                                          (1) 
𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼2𝑖 + 𝛿2𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑2𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀2𝑖𝑡                                                           (2) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼3𝑖 + 𝛿3𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑3𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀3𝑖𝑡        (3) 
In the equations above, Dependent variable can be either crime rates or mortality rates. 
Mechanism can also be air pollution or production. For Energy as an independent variable, I use 
two different elements: fossil fuel-based energy, and coal-based energy27. Therefore, I evaluate 
the above system of equations eight different times for each estimation (each dependent variable 
with each mechanism separately for each energy type fuel). 𝛼is and 𝛿ts are state-fixed and year-
fixed effects respectively. 𝑋ijts are the covariates that are controlled for, such as housing prices, 
number of police officers, unemployment, and year trend. Since the regional data might be 
correlated with time, I enter the time trend to control for such correlation. It must be noted that in 
order to make this approach work, one needs to isolate the mechanism from the interaction 
between the independent variable and dependent variable. This is a strong assumption in this 
analysis, where the major elements of the study have a strong correlation with each other and the 
controls—at the same time—which can jeopardize the true impacts of the treatments. 
                                                          
27 The reason to make a distinction between fossil fuel-based energy and coal-based energy is to verify whether 
excluding petrol and natural gas from fossil fuel-based energy can possibly worsen the impacts solely because of 
coal.  
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After estimating each linear equation via least squares, the product of coefficients method 
uses β2̂γ̂ as an estimated mechanism effect. Similarly, the difference of coefficients method 
yields an identical estimate by computing β̂1 −β3̂ in this linear case. Because β̂1 =β̂2 γ̂+β̂3 and 
β1=β2γ+β3 always hold, Equation 1 is redundant, given Equations 2 and 3. Thus, I compute β̂2γ̂ as 
a mechanism effect for two energy regimes (fossil fuel-based energy and coal-based energy) to 
verify the impacts on both violent crime rates and mortality rates. There are two different values 
for the mechanism effect (β2̂γ̂): one for the air pollution, and the other for the income. If this 
value would be positive and significant for the air pollution, it means that utilizing more fossil 
fuel energy leads to the higher rate of crimes (or mortality) channeling through the air pollution. 
The same explanation is valid for the income channel. 
Given the possible impact of air pollution (resulting from different energy regime 
consumption) on mortality rate and crime rates through channels such as health issues and 
educational quality, it may be useful to find a key factor which has a high correlation with air 
pollution but not latent variables and use that instrument in an analysis. Specifically, pollution, 
mortality rate, and criminal activity are all likely to be correlated with seasonal trends, 
coincidental weather conditions and unobservable occurrences such as economic activity. 
Another serious threat to the proposed identification, as it has been stated before, is the existence 
of reverse causality between energy use and income, which I cannot address this concern 
properly within the structure of the proposed method. 
To address such an issue, in another attempt, I utilize political party affiliation—if the 
governor is a Democrat, Independent, or Republican—as an instrument for energy consumption. 
The proposed approach is nested in the idea that the Democratic Party supports more 
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environmentally friendly regulations; therefore, they might impose more restrictions that 
conserve the environment. Conversely, the Republican Party’s approach relaxes those 
environmental laws and regulations suggested by the third entity. However, political affiliation is 
a weak IV since the excludability might be violated due to a correlation between political 
viewpoint, income, environmental policy, and living standards, and then, living standards, 
mortality rate, and criminal activity. Therefore, energy consumption is not the only channel by 
which the IV impacts the dependent variable. If one thinks the only (indirect) path from the IV to 
the dependent variable should pass through the energy channel, then, it does not satisfy the 
exclusion restriction.  
To verify the current approach, I apply a two-stage OLS method, while using political 
affiliation as an IV for energy consumption to derive the average treatment effect. The analysis 
would be as follows, and will be estimated simultaneously:  
𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿4𝑖 + 𝛾4𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑙 𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜖1𝑖𝑡                                      (4) 
𝐷𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼5𝑖 + 𝛾5𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡̂ + 𝜑𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜖2𝑖𝑡            (5) 
In Equation 4, the independent variable is Energy consumption. 𝛿𝑖, 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛾𝑡 are the state 
level and time fixed effect to absorb any potential structural differences across the cities. Xijts are 
the covariates that are going to be controlled by housing prices, air pollution, median income, 
rate of unemployment, year trend, and number of police officers (while violent crime is 
Dependent variable) or total crime (when mortality rate is Dependent variable). I also can use 
the annual change of the variables to mitigate the possible yearly effect and auto-correlation at 
the same time, or enter a year trend variable. 
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Data 
I use state-level data for all US states including Washington DC (DC) from 2001 to 2015 to 
examine the connection between energy utilization and social damages28, channeling through air 
pollution and income. I collect the data for energy consumption from the US Information 
Administration (EIA) at US Department of Energy29. Energy data is available for all the power 
plants—which extracted from power plant operations report—in each state, which generate 
electricity specifying the types of fuel they use. It contains monthly information about the heat 
and power plants across the US reported fuel type codes for boilers and cooling systems. I utilize 
the input fuel-based energy that any power plant uses to generate power, not the actual electricity 
that a plant generates as an output. This is because using fossil fuel directly may cause air 
pollution by emitting carbon or any other toxic particles. This data set uses state-level aggregate 
energy consumption, which is of its shortcomings since energy utilization of other sectors such 
as the motor vehicle is not included. Even though I may collect other sectors’ data at the state 
level and add it to my current data, this addition creates an extra concern since vehicles are 
mobile across the borders.      
The data for population, number of police officers, and reported crime rates are collected from 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s online uniform crime statistics (UCR)30. The yearly 
information is publicly available for each region and state based on two main categories of crime 
such as violent crimes (murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault) and property crimes (burglary, 
larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, arson) and also sub-level categories that are mentioned. 
                                                          
28 Which in this study are mortality and violent crime 
29 https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia923/ 
30 https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s 
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Using the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Data Center, I extract the data for the 
different mortality rates based on the causes of death31. The Compressed Mortality database, 
which is publicly available, contains population and mortality counts for all US states and 
counties. Rates and counts of death are accessible by underlying cause of death and year. Data 
are also available for the different race, gender, injury intent, and injury mechanism. One can 
request the yearly data from studied period. The underlying cause of death is specified such as 
circulatory conditions (refers to the problem with hearth and blood vessels) and respiratory 
diseases (such as asthma and lung cancer), external causes, and overall death counts.   
Here, I use particle pollution32 (PM10) as a proxy for air pollution which is a mixture of 
airborne liquid droplets and solid particles. Particle pollution varies by geographic location and 
season and is affected by various aspects of weather such as humidity, temperature, and wind. 
The major components of these particles are carbon, nitrate, and sulfate compounds, along with 
crystalline elements such as ash and soil. The chemical makeup of these particles varies across 
the US. Yearly observations for PM10 are retrieved from the US Environmental Protection 
Agency database33.  
I extract and pool the data of housing price index as a proxy for the housing prices from the 
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy34. Then, I merge the data of household median income from the 
US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to calculate the level of production by multiplying median 
income by the population35. I also use the unemployment rates in different states, which may 
                                                          
31 https://wonder.cdc.gov/cmf-icd10.html 
32 Data for PM2.5, CO, NOX, SO2 is also available in my dataset. 
33 https://aqs.epa.gov/aqsweb/airdata/download_files.html 
34 http://datatoolkits.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/land-values/land-prices-by-state.asp 
35 https://www.census.gov/topics/income-poverty/income/data/tables.html 
59 
 
play a significant role in the analysis based on its emphasized position and how it can incentivize 
jobless individuals to commit a crime.  
The constructed dataset has 50 states' information plus DC. Table 1 shows the summary of the 
statistics, which are used in the analysis. DC has the minimum amount of clean energy use, 
which is zero (during the studied period). PM10 emission figures for 2014 and 2015 are not 
available for DC. Power plants in DC also do not use coal-based fuel over the studied years 
according to the applied database.  
Data for energy consumption is available at the plant level in each state. To obtain the state-
level data, I aggregate the data to find the sum of energy use at the state level. Doing so may 
cause an issue due to the aggregating data, specifically in panel data analysis. To address this 
concern, I use the weighted least-squared approach in which the number of the energy plants are 
used as the weights.  
Results and Discussion 
Following the proposed steps, and using the yearly data for all US states from 2001 to 2015 at 
the state level, pooling from the CDC, FBI, EPA, EIA, BLS, and LILP databases, I report the 
primary results in Table 12. It must be noted that data for violent crimes, production, number of 
police officers, energy consumption, and mortality rates have been normalized by state 
population per hundred thousand. Table 12 shows the impacts of different elements of this 
empirical model on the social damages (violent crimes and mortality). While air pollution and 
income are introduced in this study as mediators between energy utilization and social damages, 
there is still significant impacts from using different types of energy on the dependent variables 
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despite controlling for these two mechanisms. It raises this valid concern: that there might be 
other direct or indirect impacts of energy use on violent crimes and mortality which are not 
considered in this analysis.  
In this study, energy consumption (total energy consumption, fossil fuel-based energy, and 
coal-based energy) and air pollution elevation increase the likelihood of both violent crime rates 
and mortality rates, while income decreases such a chance on the latent variables. Increasing the 
total energy consumption by one million BTU per hundred thousand habitants escalates the 
violent crime rates by almost 0.2 percent. This amount increases the mortality rates by around 
0.07 percent. While the increments of the violent crimes do not roughly vary across different 
energy regimes, switching the total energy to coal-based energy surges the negative impact on 
mortality rates by three folds (from 0.07 to 0.24).          
Here, I am not only interested in the sign of the impact (positive or negative) but also the 
exact level of point estimates, since the existing trade-off between lower pollution and higher 
income makes the ultimate impact unclear. Tables 13 and 14 show the main results for 
mechanism analysis when the dependent variable is violent crime rates. In the first table, air 
pollution is the mediator between energy utilization and violent crime rates, while in the latter 
table income is the mediator. This is the point, we can compute the magnitude of the impacts of 
each mechanism separately36. The effects of air pollution that arise from fossil fuel-based energy 
and coal-based energy on violent crime rates are 1.37E-4 and 6.9E-4, respectively. It means that 
violent crime rates increase by almost 0.01 percent through air pollution in the affected regions 
                                                          
36 β̂2γ̂, in which β̂2 is the coefficient of the energy in regressing the mechanism as a dependent variable [Equation 2], 
and γ̂ is the coefficient of the mechanism in the final regression [Equation 3]; combined, I have my mechanism 
impact 
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when one million BTU of fossil fuel-based energy is used. This amount hikes to 0.07 percent 
when fossil-based energy is replaced by solely coal-based energy. Similarly, we can compute the 
effects of income as the mediator on violent crime rates. The following values are obtained: -
2.4E-5 when fossil fuel-based energy is used, and -1.039E-4 when coal-based energy is used. It 
implies that violent crime rates decrease by nearly 0.002 percent and 0.01 percent due to the one 
million BTU fossil fuel-based and coal-based energy utilization, respectively.        
Tables 15 and 16 display the related results when the dependent variable is mortality rates. In 
Table 15, air pollution is the mediator between energy utilization and mortality rates, and in 
Table 16, income is the mediator. Accordingly, we can calculate the effects of each mechanism 
independently. The impacts of air pollution that emerge from fossil fuel-based energy and coal-
based energy on mortality rates are 2.8E-5 and 1.39E-4, respectively. It indicates that mortality 
rates decrease by about 0.003 percent through air pollution in the contaminated areas when one 
million BTU of fossil fuel-based energy is utilized. This amount boosts to 0.01 percent when 
solely coal-based energy is substituted. Likewise, we can calculate the impacts of income as the 
mediator on mortality rates. The results are -7.7E-5 when fossil fuel-based energy is utilized and 
-5.35E-4 when coal-based energy is utilized. It signifies that mortality rates diminish due to the 
one million BTU fossil fuel-based and coal-based energy utilization by approximately 0.007 
percent and 0.05 percent, respectively.  
Diving more deeply into the results to calculate the mechanism impacts, we can see that the 
impacts of air pollution on violent crime rate—in both studied energy regimes—are greater than 
the effects of production (the mechanism effects for the air pollution are 1.37E-4 & 6.9E-4 vs. -
2.4E-5 & -1.039E-4 for the production as a mechanism); therefore, the ultimate effect of energy 
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utilization (fossil fuel-based energy and coal-based energy) on criminal activity—via air 
pollution and income channels—is positive (which is not favorable). The opposite effect is 
noticed in the mortality rate scenario. While utilizing fossil fuel energy causes more pollution in 
the region of analysis, it correlates with higher rates of death because of lower production and 
income levels (the mechanism effects for the air pollution are 2.8E-5 & 1.39E-4 vs. -7.7E-5 & -
5.35E-4 for the production as a mechanism).  
The results convey that utilizing more fossil fuel-based energy elevates air pollution but does 
not lead to increased criminal activity and mortality rates at the state level in a similar direction. 
Changing the energy sources from clean to fossil fuel-based—as a primary factor of production, 
thus, income—has a positive impact on household income; therefore, by increasing living 
standards, fossil fuel energy diminishes mortality rates but not crime rates. Thus, it is the case 
that switching from fossil fuel energy to clean energy exacerbates mortality rates but alleviates 
criminal activity37.    
The results—using the IV approach—are depicted in Table 17. In this analysis political 
affiliation is granted as the instrument for energy utilization38. Air pollution and income are the 
important elements that are being controlled in this evaluation; hence, I do not perform the 
mechanism approach. We can see that energy utilization does not have any significant impact on 
violent crimes and mortality rates (although the magnitude of the effect is negative). There is no 
effect from income on the latent variables as well. The results show that death rates increase 
                                                          
37 Coal-based and clean-based comparison has been conducted in the appendix. 
38 If a governor of a state considers himself or herself as a democrat or republican. 
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significantly due to air pollution. While we can observe the similar effect on the violent crime 
rates, this influence is not statistically significant.  
The IV shows that if we control for income and air pollution, the impact of the different 
energy utilization on the social damages drops to zero; however, it is not the case in the 
mechanism analysis. Since political affiliation is not a reliable IV (it can correlate with both air 
pollution and income level—because of the possible contrasting policy scenarios due to the 
differences in political viewpoints), we cannot exclusively have confidence in the derived 
interpretations from this outcome. The result from the first stage analysis shows that the political 
affiliation does not significantly correlate with the fossil fuel energy consumption. Therefore, I 
conduct various robustness checks to verify whether the results of the mechanism analysis are 
trustworthy.           
Robustness check 
Testing for the omitted variable 
Since I do not use a valid instrument to control for possible endogeneity, here, I try to take 
advantage of the Oster (2017) proposition—that is built on Altonji et al. (2005) approach—
which indicates the magnitude of the selection of the observable to estimate the impact of the 
unobservable in the model facing the endogeneity issue. The objective is to measure the primary 
model’s sensitivity to the key control variables, based on the changes in R-square—which can 
explain the variation of the specified elements in the model on the dependent variable—and the 
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shifts in the main coefficient39. Therefore, if the main coefficient does not vary relative to the 
changes in R-square while control variables are included in the model, then we can conclude that 
the coefficient is robust and presents the real effect. Table 18 shows the analysis for the violent 
crime rate variable that gives us some insight about the sensitivity of the coefficient of the 
independent variable to the control elements. We can see that including the control variables 
(such as the number of police officers, and unemployment rates, housing prices, and year trend), 
while increasing the R-square by one unit, decreases fossil fuel-based energy coefficients by 
more than one unit. This amount is less than one unit for coal-based energy. This more complete 
model suggests that fossil fuel energy may explain causation in violent crime rate through the 
proposed channel. In Table 19, we can observe the same analysis and results for mortality rate, 
which suggests that there is a causation between the explanatory variables (fossil fuel-based 
energy and coal-based energy) and the dependent variable (mortality) in the constructed model40. 
Placebo test 
Previously, my discussion focused on the effect of energy changes on violent crime rates. 
Another approach to validate the results is performing the same analysis but changing only the 
dependent variable. To test that hypothesis, I switch the focus from violent crime rates to 
property crime rates, and verify the results. The idea here is that the air pollution can affect 
health outcomes, impact the nervous system, and can result in violent crime but not property 
offenses such as burglary. The same may be true for energy’s effect on death rates. Since air 
pollution does not affect all variations in the type of death, I can take advantage of it and perform 
                                                          
39 Here, I assume that the primary model is when energy use is independent and dependent variables are crime rates 
and mortality rates, and the rest of the variables are assumed to be controls. And the reason for doing so is to verify 
if energy use has any identifiable impact (using the merged dataset) on the latent variables in the first place. 
40 It shows that the impact of the unobservable on the coefficient of the independent variable is negligible. 
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the analysis changing the dependent variable from circulatory problems to external causes 
(which includes accidents, for example) and validate the conclusion. 
Results are summarized in Tables 10 (for violent and property crime rates) and 11 (for 
circulatory conditions and external causes). Table 20 confirms that while air pollution via energy 
utilization increases violent crime rates, it does not affect property crime rates. This hypothesis is 
valid when the independent variable is coal-based energy but not fossil fuel-based energy. This 
test does not reveal any income impact on the latent variable. Table 21 supports the unfavorable 
effect of air pollution on mortality rate. While air pollution increases the circulatory conditions, it 
does diminish the external cause of death (which could potentially be a problem). On the other 
hand, income decreases the circulatory conditions but not significantly decreases the external 
causes. This outcome gives us a level of confidence in identifying a strong correlation, even 
causation, between energy consumption and mortality rate channeling through air pollution and 
income. In another attempt, I compare the results between the clean energy and coal-based 
energy in Appendix III.   
Sensitivity analysis for the mechanism design 
Imai et al. (2010) propose a falsification test for a causal mechanism analysis based on the 
correlation between the error for the mechanism model, 𝜀2i𝑡, and the error for the outcome model, 
𝜀3it. They argue that this correlation between the two error terms serves as the sensitivity 
parameter. Such an association can arise if there are omitted variables that affect both mediator 
and outcome variables, since these omitted variables will be part of the two error terms. This 
proposed test differs from the test of omitted variable in the first section of robustness check 
since in this section I try to validate the mechanism approach and verify whether there is an 
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omitted variable within this specific approach. However, in the previous test, no mechanism has 
been detected, and all the other elements—aside from the dependents and independent—are 
assumed to be controls. Another variation between these two tests is the way that we perform 
them and how to detect the omitted variable. In the current approach, we try to disclose any 
correlation among the error terms in both mechanism model and the full model. However, in 
Oster’s approach, we are looking for the robustness of the main coefficient to the presence of the 
control variables. 
As it is tested separately (in Table 22 for both mortality rates and violent crime rates while the 
independent variable is fossil fuel-based energy), no significant correlation between the error 
terms has been detected. The same analysis has been conducted when fossil fuel-based energy is 
replaced by coal-based energy, and identical results have been driven. Executing this test 
suggests that the likelihood of having an omitted variable in the proposed model using 
mechanism design is low.  
Income effect 
There is an ongoing discussion between the correlation of a country’s income level and the 
willingness to apply environmental policies such as subsidizing clean energy. The idea is a 
nation needs to reach a certain level of wealth to start regulating the environment. While this 
debate focuses on developing and developed countries, it might play a role among different 
states as well, since a state like Mississippi earns around forty thousand dollars per capita, while 
New Jersey earns double this amount per year. Table 23 shows such analysis, which does not 
reveal any new information. 
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Conclusion 
In closing the above discussion, I conclude that utilizing more non-renewable and cheap 
energy increases mortality rates—such as circulatory problems—and the possibility of having 
violent crimes—but not property crimes. Additionally, non-renewable energy imposes slightly 
less economical cost while having its environmental damages within the context of the study. 
The findings can point out the highly significant correlation and possible statistical causation 
between fossil fuel-based energy utilization and social damages—such as violent crime and 
mortality rate. Consuming fossil fuel energy increases both income level and air pollution; at the 
same time, air pollution boosts up social damages while income reduces them. The results show 
that income channel outweighs air pollution channel when the latent variable is mortality rates. 
Therefore, employing fossil fuel energy is in our favor. However, the adverse results are 
obtained when mortality rates are substituted by violent crime rates. 
It must be taken into account that the US spends more than $28 billion dollars on the justice 
system (yearly, at the federal level), while at the same time more than 9,200,000 crimes occurred 
in the US. Having considered half of the budget as a fixed cost, the Justice Department spends 
around $1,500 per crime, using a rough calculation. Decreasing illegal activities by just one 
percent can reduce the cost by more than $140,000 per year. The rough calculated amount can 
give us an incentive to understand the social cost hidden in the crime, which has not been 
included in our economic analysis. An interpretation of such social damages is vital to 
incorporate if one wants to include those expenses to compute the more accurate production cost 
analysis. We need to add the percentage changes in mortality rate as well (by saving health 
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costs), which can suggest an even higher amount of neglected social expenses in our cost 
analysis of choosing the type of energy to consume. 
The primary aspiration of this research is to study the trade-off between utilizing cheaper, 
contaminated energy to produce more, and using cleaner, expensive energy to pollute less. 
Therefore, it is crucial that policy makers are convinced that the analysis is decisive. 
Accordingly, finding an accountable exogenous variation seems to be the vital clue in this 
application. Thus, a possible extension of the current work would be employing a relevant 
energy policy change in any state during the studied period to administer a causal analysis. States 
such as Massachusetts, Washington, and California have adopted different energy acts in 
previous years which can be suitable for the intended exploration.    
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Appendix to Chapter I 
 
Figure 1: Different growth rate in population for the social planner solution. 
Figure 1 shows population growth (the U.S. labor force), fossil fuel utilization, economic growth and 
capital accumulation, while a population grows by 0.02 % (blue lines) and 0.6% (red lines) per year. The 
population grows exogenously and the social planner solution has been applied for both cases. 
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Figure 2: Exogenous population growth versus endogenous for the social planner solution. 
 
Figure 2 shows population growth (the U.S. labor force), fossil fuel utilization, economic growth and 
capital accumulation, while a population grows endogenously (red lines), and when population growth is 
exogenous, and equals to 0.02% (blue lines). The social planner solution has been applied for both cases. 
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Figure 3: Exogenous population growth versus endogenous for the market-based approach. 
 
 Figure 3 shows population growth (the U.S. labor force), fossil fuel utilization, economic growth and 
capital accumulation, while a population grows endogenously (blue lines), and when population growth is 
exogenous, and equals to 0.02% (red lines). The market-based approach has been applied for both scenarios. 
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Figure 4: Endogenous population in the social planner versus the market-based approach. 
Figure 4 shows population growth (the U.S. labor force), fossil fuel utilization, economic growth and 
capital accumulation for the market-based approach (blue lines) and social planner solution (red lines). 
The population grows endogenously in both cases. 
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Figure 5-A: Carbon tax element on the fossil fuel utilization for the market-based approach. 
Figure 5-A shows the fossil fuel production (per petawatt hour) and the tax rate (per kilowatt hour of 
energy production using fossil fuel resources) given the intervention in the market for the endogenous 
population.  
 
Figure 5-B: Comparison between the market-based approach, policy intervention on fossil fuel 
utilization, and social planner solution. 
Figure 5-B shows economic growth and fossil fuel utilization when there is no intervention in the 
decentralized model (blue lines), while there exists a carbon-tax (red lines), and the social planner 
solution (yellow lines). 
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Figure 5-C: Comparison between base model and policy interventions on fossil fuel utilization. 
Figure 5-C shows population growth (the U.S. labor force), fossil fuel utilization, economic growth 
and capital accumulation when there is no intervention in the market (blue lines), while there exists a 
carbon-tax (or tax on using fossil fuel energy), which decreases the profit in energy sectors to zero (red 
lines), and when government regulates the market by imposing a policy which requires firms to invest in 
clean energy production by 5% annually (yellow lines). All models are decentralized. 
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Table 1: Values of the parameters used in the model 
Parameter Value Description 
   α 0.27 Capital share 
   γ 0.04 Energy share 
   ϑ 1.16 Fossil fuel impact on environment 
θ 0.85 Clean energy technology impact on the new technology 
ω 0.02 Researchers and financial impacts on the clean energy technology 
ε1 1.68 Income effect on the population growth 
ε2 2.16 Industrialization effect on the population growth 
ρ 0.5 Substitution rate between clean energy and fossil fuel 
 
 
 
Table 2: Initial values of the variables in the model 
State variable K (mil 
$) 
PL 
(million) 
TL 
(million) 
FE (Gigawatthour) 𝐹𝐸̅̅ ̅̅  (Gigawatthour) 
T0 = 2012 1.8e+7 1.9e+2 1.2 17,680 5,205,000 
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Table 3: Compensating variation* among different models   
Moving away To Gain(+)/loss(-) 
Social planner exogenous** Market-based exogenous -2.8% 
Social planner endogenous*** Market-based endogenous -3.3% 
Market-based endogenous Regulation on energy investment -0.6% 
Market-based endogenous Taxed on fossil fuel +2.3 
* The CV measures the percent of consumption of individuals in one economy, who need to be 
compensated in order to give up living in that economy and move to another 
** Exogenous population growth 
*** Endogenous population growth 
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List of variables and parameters used in the model 
U: Utility function  
C: Consumption 
Y: Production/income 
K: Physical capital 
I: Investment in physical capital 
L: Total number of laborers in the economy (the summation of workers and researchers) 
PL: Number of workers available in the production process 
TL: Number of researchers available in producing technology (Jones, 2002, uses 0.036*L) 
A: Technological progress in the production function 
AC: Required technology to utilize clean energy 
N: Total population 
CE: Clean energy 
FE: Fossil fuel energy 
E: Total energy consumption 
ED: Environmental degradation, or damage function 
PFE: Price of fossil fuel energy use 
PAC: Price of clean energy use 
WG: Compensation due to a change in individuals’ consumption 
β: Discount factor (0.96 is used vastly in the Macro literature) 
δ: Capital depreciation, 0.03 has been used as a value in this research 
ξ: Fraction of the population in the labor force based on the BLS is 0.63  
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α: Capital share in the production function (the range between 0.27 ~ 0.33 are used vastly in 
the Macro literature) 
σ: Level of risk aversion of the agent 
γ: Energy share in the production function (Krusell [2012] used 0.04) 
ρ: Substitution rate between clean energy and fossil fuel energy (Popp [2004] used 0.49 in his 
model) 
υ: Impact of the fossil fuel energy consumption on the environmental degradation 
φ: Normalizing factor to keep the negative impact of FE on the production less than one 
ω: Impact of researchers on the production of clean energy technology (Jones [2002] used 
0.015) 
θ: Impact of the old clean energy technology on new technology (Jones [2002] used 0.94) 
ε1: Per capita income effect on the population growth (Cigno [1981] did not use any value 
since it was purely a theory-based paper) 
ε2: Effect of the level of industrialization on the population growth 
ε: Error term in stochastic shocks of technology in the production function which is normally 
distributed with the mean zero and standard deviation of σ 
A̅: Constant growth for technological progress in the production function 
L̅: Constant population growth (based on the average population growth in the U.S.)  
AC0: Residuals in the equation explaining the technology for utilizing clean energy 
Data calibration 
To estimate the parameters of Equation 7, I used the time series for the US data. The main 
equation according to the model is: EDt = 1 −
FEt
φ
ϑ
. Therefore, the estimating equation is given 
by: 
log (yt) = β1 + β2log(FEt) + εt          (B1) 
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where   yt = 1 − EDt, β2 = −ϑ and β1 = ϑlog (φ) , εt = ρεt−1 + ϵt 
The table below shows the results. The error terms are serially correlated. To estimate the above 
model, I used the generalized least-squares method to estimate the parameters in a linear regression 
analysis in which the errors are serially correlated. Specifically, the errors are assumed to follow a 
first-order autoregressive process. Based on the above estimation, we get the below values for the 
estimated parameters: ϑ = 1.162 and φ = 197738.7 
 
Table 4: Estimating the parameters in Equation 7 
LED Coef Std. Err. t-stat P > | t | 
LEF -1.1616 0.2812 -4.13 0.000 
Cons 14.1654 3.0871 4.59 0.000 
R-square 0.967 
 
LED = log of biocapacity index as a proxy for environmental degradation 
LFE = log of fossil fuel energy production, trillion BTU 
To derive the values of parameters in Equation 8 [ACt+1 = AC0ACt
θ(TLtTYt)
ω], we can use 
the following values for θ and ω based on Jones' (2002) calibration: θ = 0.94 and ω= 0.015. 
However, I changed the model by entering the interaction of financing the technology; therefore, 
it is advantageous to estimate it as follows: 
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log(ACt+1) = log(AC0) + θ log(ACt) + ω log(TLt ∗ TYt) + ϵt    (B2) 
 
Table 5: Estimating the parameters in Equation 8 
LACP Coef Std. Err. t-stat P > | t | 
LAC 0.844 0.0203 41.49 0.000 
LTYL 0.022 0.0045 4.90 0.000 
LAC0 (Cons) 1.159 0.2855 4.06 0.001 
R-square 0.957 
 
LACP= log of technology of clean energy utilization for the next period 
LAC= log of technology of clean energy utilization 
LTYL= log of the interaction between TL and TY (number of the researchers in the economy 
and the required resources to finance the technology) 
Based on the above estimation, we get the below values for the estimated parameters: θ = 0.84 
and ω= 0.02 which is similar to the Jones’ original calibration. 
To estimate Equation 15 parameters, I need to use time series again. The main equation 
according to the model is: Lt+1 = Lt + L0(
Yt
Lt
⁄ )ε1(
Lt
Kt
⁄ )ε2  
 
81 
 
Therefore, the estimating equation is defined as: 
log (gLt) = ε0 + ε1log (
Yt
Lt
⁄ ) + ε2log (
Lt
Kt
⁄ ) + εt        (B3) 
where 𝜀0 = log (L0) and g is the growth rate, rearrange the above equation for L, we get: 
 log(gLt) = ε0 + ε1 log(Yt) + ε
′
2 log(Kt) + ε′′ log(Lt) + εt     (B4) 
where ε′2 = −ε2  and ε
′′ = ε2 − ε1 
Table 6: Estimating the parameters in Equation 15 
LGN Coef Std. Err. t-stat P > | t | 
LY 1.679 0.18 9.31 0.000 
LK -2.163 0.213 -10.16 0.000 
LL 0.485 0.056 8.65 0.000 
Cons 0.856 0.624 1.37 0.182 
R-square 0.988 
LGN= log of population growth 
LY= log of Y (GDP) (1.895) 
LK= log of K (physical capital) (-2.11) 
LL = log of L (labor force) (0.215)    Cons (17.354) (L0=3.4E+7) 
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Based on the above regression, the estimated parameters are:  
ε1 = 1.679 , ε2 = 2.163 and L0 = 2.353. 
Solving the F.O.C’s for both social planner and market-based approaches 
Solving the social planner's F.O.C [exogenous population] 
Yt = (1 −
FEt
φ
ϑ
)[AtKt
αPLt
1−α−γ[(ACtCE)
ρ + FEt
ρ
]
γ
ρ⁄ ]     (C1) 
(1 −
FEt
φ
ϑ
) (AtKt
αPLt
1−α−γ)((ACtCE)
ρ + FEt
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ = Ct + Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt +
(P0 + P1(
∑ FEi
t
i=1
FE̅̅̅̅
⁄ )P2 + P3(
FEt
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
⁄ )P4) FEt + TYt     
 (C2) 
(1 −
FEt
φ
ϑ
) (AtKt
α(lPLLt)
1−α−γ)((ACtCE)
ρ + FEt
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ = Ct + Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt +
(P0 + P1(
∑ FEi
t
i=1
FE̅̅̅̅
⁄ )P2 + P3(
FEt
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
⁄ )P4) FEt + TYt     (C3) 
ACt+1 = AC0ACt
θ(lPLLtTYt)
ω        (C4) 
Solving the Euler equations for the social planner when the population is exogenous 
First-order conditions are: 
{Ct}: β
t Ct
−σ
Lt
1−σ = λ1t          (C5) 
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{Kt+1}: λ1t+1{α (1 −
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
) (At+1Kt+1
α−1(lPLLt+1)
1−α−γ)((ACt+1CE)
ρ + FEt+1
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ + 1 −
δ} = λ1t           
 (C6) 
 {FEt}: (1 −
FEt
φ
ϑ
) (AtKt
α(lPLLt)
1−α−γ)γFEt
ρ−1
((ACtCE)
ρ + FEt
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ −1 −
ϑ
φ
FEt
φ
ϑ−1
(AtKt
α(lPLLt)
1−α−γ)((ACtCE)
ρ + FEt
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ − (P0 + P1(
∑ FEi
t
i=1
FE̅̅̅̅
⁄ )P2 +
P3(
FEt
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
⁄ )P4 + (
P1P2
FE̅̅ ̅̅
(
∑ FEi
t
i=1
FE̅̅̅̅
⁄ )
P2−1
+
P3P4
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
(
FEt
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
⁄ )P4−1)FEt) = 0  (C7) 
{ACt+1}: λ2t+1{θAC0ACt+1
θ−1(lTLLt+1TYt+1)
ω} + λ1t+1 {(1 −
                
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
) At+1Kt+1
α (lPLLt+1)
1−α−γγCEρACt+1
ρ−1
((ACt+1CE)
ρ + FEt+1
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ −1} = λ2t (C8) 
{TYt}: λ1t = λ2t[ωAC0ACt
θ(lTLLt)
ωTYt
ω−1]      (C9) 
Substituting Equations 58 and 62 (and the updated forms of them) in the above F.O.Cs, we get 
the following Euler equations:     
β
Ct+1
−σ
Lt+1
1−σ {α (1 −
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
) (At+1Kt+1
α−1(lPLLt+1)
1−α−γ)((ACt+1CE)
ρ + FEt+1
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ + 1 − δ} =
Ct
−σ
Lt
1−σ 
            (C10) 
And the above equation, when there is no fossil fuel energy left to use, is: 
β
Ct+1
−σ
Lt+1
1−σ {α(At+1Kt+1
α−1(lPLLt+1)
1−α−γ)(ACt+1CE)
γ + 1 − δ} =
Ct
−σ
Lt
1−σ   (C11) 
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(1 −
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
) (At+1Kt+1
α (lPLLt+1)
1−α−γ)γFEt+1
ρ−1
((ACt+1CE)
ρ + FEt+1
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ −1 =
ϑ
φ
FEt+1
φ
ϑ−1
(At+1Kt+1
α (lPLLt+1)
1−α−γ)((ACt+1CE)
ρ + FEt+1
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ + P0 + P1(
∑ FEi
t+1
i=1
FE̅̅̅̅
⁄ )P2 +
P3(
FEt
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
⁄ )P4 + (
P1P2
FE̅̅ ̅̅
(
∑ FEi
t+1
i=1
FE̅̅̅̅
⁄ )
P2−1
+
P3P4
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
(
FEt+1
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
⁄ )P4−1)FEt+1  (C12) 
β
Ct+1
−σ
Lt+1
1−σ
ωAC0ACt+1
θ (lTLLt+1)ωTYt+1
ω−1 {θAC0ACt+1
θ−1(lTLLt+1TYt+1)
ω} + β
Ct+1
−σ
Lt+1
1−σ {(1 −
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
) At+1Kt+1
α (lPLLt+1)
1−α−γγCEρACt+1
ρ−1
((ACt+1CE)
ρ + FEt+1
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ −1} =
Ct
−σ
Lt
1−σ
ωAC0ACt
θ(lTLLt)ωTYt
ω−1           (C13) 
And the above equation, when no fossil fuel energy remains, is: 
β
Ct+1
−σ
Lt+1
1−σ
ωAC0ACt+1
θ (lTLLt+1)ωTYt+1
ω−1 {θAC0ACt+1
θ−1(lTLLt+1TYt+1)
ω} +
β
Ct+1
−σ
Lt+1
1−σ {At+1Kt+1
α (lPLLt+1)
1−α−γγCE(ACt+1CE)
γ−1} =
Ct
−σ
Lt
1−σ
ωAC0ACt
θ(lTLLt)ωTYt
ω−1   (C14) 
Solving the social planner's F.O.C [endogenous population]) 
By solving the Euler equations for the social planner when the population is endogenous, the 
first-order conditions are: 
{Ct}: β
t Ct
−σ
Lt
1−σ = λ1t                (C15) 
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{Lt+1} : − β
t+1Ct+1
1−σLt+1
σ−2 + λ1t+1 {(1 − α − γ) (1 −
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
) (At+1Kt+1
α (lPL)
1−α−γ(Lt+1)
−α−γ)((ACt+1CE)
ρ + FEt+1
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ } +
λ2t+1{ωAC0ACt+1
θ (lTLTYt+1)
ωLt+1
ω−1} + λ3t+1 {L0(ε2 − αε1 − γε1) (1 −
 
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
)
ε1
At+1
ε1 Kt+1
αε1−ε2lPL
ε1−αε1−ε1γLt+1
ε2−αε1−γε1−1((ACt+1CE)
ρ + FEt+1
ρ
)
γε1
ρ⁄ + 1} = λ3t (C16) 
{Kt+1}: λ1t+1 {(1 −
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
) α(At+1Kt+1
α−1(lPLLt+1)
1−α−γ)((ACt+1CE)
ρ + FEt+1
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ + 1 −
δ} + λ3t+1{(αε1 − ε2)L0 (1 −
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
)
ε1
At+1
ε1 Kt+1
αε1−ε2−1lPL
ε1−αε1−ε1γLt+1
ε2−αε1−γε1((ACt+1CE)
ρ +
FEt+1
ρ
)
γε1
ρ⁄ = λ1t          (C17) 
{FEt}:  λ1t {(1 −
FEt
φ
ϑ
) (AtKt
α(lPLLt)
1−α−γ)γFEt
ρ−1
((ACtCE)
ρ + FEt
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ −1 −
             
ϑ
φ
FEt
φ
ϑ−1
(AtKt
α(lPLLt)
1−α−γ)((ACtCE)
ρ + FEt
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ − (P0 + P1(
∑ FEi
t
i=1
FE̅̅̅̅
⁄ )P2 +
P3(
FEt
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
⁄ )P4 + (
P1P2
FE̅̅ ̅̅
(
∑ FEi
t
i=1
FE̅̅̅̅
⁄ )
P2−1
+
P3P4
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
(
FEt
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
⁄ )P4−1)FEt)} +  λ3t{L0 (1 −
             
FEt
φ
ϑ
)
ε1
At
ε1Kt
αε1−ε2lPL
ε1−αε1−ε1γLt
ε2−αε1−γε1γε1FEt
ρ−1
((ACtCE)
ρ + FEt
ρ
)
γε1
ρ⁄ −1 −
             L0
ϑε1
φ
FEt
φ
ϑ−1
(1 −
FEt
φ
ϑ
)
ε1−1
At
ε1Kt
αε1−ε2lPL
ε1−αε1−ε1γLt
ε2−αε1−γε1+1((ACtCE)
ρ +
FEt
ρ
)
γε1
ρ⁄ } = 0          (C18) 
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{ACt+1}: λ1t+1 {(1 −
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
) At+1Kt+1
α (lPLLt+1)
1−α−γγCEρACt+1
ρ−1
((ACt+1CE)
ρ +
FEt+1
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ −1} + λ2t+1{θAC0ACt+1
θ−1(lTLLt+1TYt+1)
ω} + λ3t+1{γε1CE
ρACt+1
ρ−1
L0 (1 −
                
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
)
ε1
At+1
ε1 Kt+1
αε1−ε2lPL
ε1−αε1−ε1γLt+1
ε2−αε1−γε1((ACt+1CE)
ρ + FEt+1
ρ
)
γε1
ρ⁄ −1} = λ2t 
            (C19) 
{TYt}: λ1t = λ2t[ωAC0ACt
θ(lTLLt)
ωTYt
ω−1]      
 (C20) 
Substituting Equations 68 and 73 (and the updated forms of them) in the above F.O.Cs, we get 
the following equations: 
−βt+1Ct+1
1−σLt+1
σ−2 +  βt+1
Ct+1
−σ
Lt+1
1−σ {(1 − α − γ) (1 −
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
) (At+1Kt+1
α (lPL)
1−α−γ(Lt+1)
−α−γ)((ACt+1CE)
ρ + FEt+1
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ } +
βt+1
Ct+1
−σ
Lt+1
1−σ
ωAC0ACt+1
θ (lTLLt+1)ωTYt+1
ω−1 {ωAC0ACt+1
θ (lTLTYt+1)
ωLt+1
ω−1} + λ3t+1 {L0(ε2 − αε1 −
γε1) (1 −
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
)
ε1
At+1
ε1 Kt+1
αε1−ε2lPL
ε1−αε1−ε1γLt+1
ε2−αε1−γε1−1((ACt+1CE)
ρ + FEt+1
ρ
)
γε1
ρ⁄ + 1} = λ3t 
            (C21) 
 βt+1
Ct+1
−σ
Lt+1
1−σ {(1 −
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
) α(At+1Kt+1
α−1(lPLLt+1)
1−α−γ)((ACt+1CE)
ρ + FEt+1
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ + 1 − δ} +
λ3t+1{(αε1 − ε2)L0 (1 −
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
)
ε1
At+1
ε1 Kt+1
αε1−ε2−1lPL
ε1−αε1−ε1γLt+1
ε2−αε1−γε1((ACt+1CE)
ρ +
FEt+1
ρ
)
γε1
ρ⁄ = βt
Ct
−σ
Lt
1−σ          (C22) 
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βt
Ct
−σ
Lt
1−σ {(1 −
FEt
φ
ϑ
) (AtKt
α(lPLLt)
1−α−γ)γFEt
ρ−1
((ACtCE)
ρ + FEt
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ −1 −
ϑ
φ
FEt
φ
ϑ−1
(AtKt
α(lPLLt)
1−α−γ)((ACtCE)
ρ + FEt
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ − (P0 + P1(
∑ FEi
t
i=1
FE̅̅̅̅
⁄ )P2 +
P3(
FEt
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
⁄ )P4 + (
P1P2
FE̅̅ ̅̅
(
∑ FEi
t
i=1
FE̅̅̅̅
⁄ )
P2−1
+
P3P4
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
(
FEt
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
⁄ )P4−1)FEt)} +  λ3t{L0 (1 −
FEt
φ
ϑ
)
ε1
At
ε1Kt
αε1−ε2lPL
ε1−αε1−ε1γLt
ε2−αε1−γε1γε1FEt
ρ−1
((ACtCE)
ρ + FEt
ρ
)
γε1
ρ⁄ −1 −
L0
ϑε1
φ
FEt
φ
ϑ−1
(1 −
FEt
φ
ϑ
)
ε1−1
At
ε1Kt
αε1−ε2lPL
ε1−αε1−ε1γLt
ε2−αε1−γε1((ACtCE)
ρ + FEt
ρ
)
γε1
ρ⁄ } = 0 
            (C23) 
βt+1
Ct+1
−σ
Lt+1
1−σ {(1 −
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
) At+1Kt+1
α (lPLLt+1)
1−α−γγCEρACt+1
ρ−1
((ACt+1CE)
ρ + FEt+1
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ −1} +
βt+1
Ct+1
−σ
Lt+1
1−σ
ωAC0ACt+1
θ (lTLLt+1)ωTYt+1
ω−1 {θAC0ACt+1
θ−1(lTLLt+1TYt+1)
ω} + λ3t+1{γε1CE
ρACt+1
ρ−1
L0 (1 −
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
)
ε1
At+1
ε1 Kt+1
αε1−ε2lPL
ε1−αε1−ε1γLt+1
ε2−αε1−γε1((ACt+1CE)
ρ + FEt+1
ρ
)
γε1
ρ⁄ −1} =
βt
Ct
−σ
Lt
1−σ
ωAC0ACt
θ(lTLLt)ωTYt
ω−1          (C24) 
Now, we rearrange Equation 75 for 𝜆3𝑡, update it to get 𝜆3𝑡+1, and replace it back into 
Equations 74, 75 and 77, having our three Euler equations as follows: 
−βCt+1
1−σLt+1
σ−2 +  β
Ct+1
−σ
Lt+1
1−σ {(1 − α − γ) (1 −
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
) (At+1Kt+1
α (lPL)
1−α−γ(Lt+1)
−α−γ)((ACt+1CE)
ρ + FEt+1
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ } +
β
Ct+1
−σ
Lt+1
1−σ
ωAC0ACt+1
θ (lTLLt+1)ωTYt+1
ω−1 {ωAC0ACt+1
θ (lTLTYt+1)
ωLt+1
ω−1} +
AA
BB
∗ {L0(ε2 − αε1 −
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γε1) (1 −
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
)
ε1
At+1
ε1 Kt+1
αε1−ε2lPL
ε1−αε1−ε1γLt+1
ε2−αε1−γε1−1((ACt+1CE)
ρ + FEt+1
ρ
)
γε1
ρ⁄ + 1} =
CC
DD
 
            (C25) 
AA=−β
Ct+1
−σ
Lt+1
1−σ {(1 −
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
) (At+1Kt+1
α (lPLLt+1)
1−α−γ)γFEt+1
ρ−1
((ACt+1CE)
ρ + FEt+1
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ −1 −
ϑ
φ
FEt+1
φ
ϑ−1
(At+1Kt+1
α (lPLLt+1)
1−α−γ)((ACt+1CE)
ρ + FEt+1
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ − (P0 + P1(
∑ FEi
t+1
i=1
FE̅̅̅̅
⁄ )P2 +
P3(
FEt+1
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
⁄ )P4 + (
P1P2
FE̅̅ ̅̅
(
∑ FEi
t+1
i=1
FE̅̅̅̅
⁄ )
P2−1
+
P3P4
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
(
FEt+1
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
⁄ )P4−1)FEt+1)} 
BB={L0 (1 −
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
)
ε1
At+1
ε1 Kt+1
αε1−ε2lPL
ε1−αε1−ε1γLt+1
ε2−αε1−γε1γε1FEt+1
ρ−1
((ACt+1CE)
ρ +
FEt+1
ρ
)
γε1
ρ⁄ −1 − L0
ϑε1
φ
FEt+1
φ
ϑ−1
(1 −
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
)
ε1−1
At+1
ε1 Kt+1
αε1−ε2lPL
ε1−αε1−ε1γLt+1
ε2−αε1−γε1((ACt+1CE)
ρ + FEt+1
ρ
)
γε1
ρ⁄ } 
CC=−
Ct
−σ
Lt
1−σ {(1 −
FEt
φ
ϑ
) (AtKt
α(lPLLt)
1−α−γ)γFEt
ρ−1
((ACtCE)
ρ + FEt
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ −1 −
ϑ
φ
FEt
φ
ϑ−1
(AtKt
α(lPLLt)
1−α−γ)((ACtCE)
ρ + FEt
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ − (P0 + P1(
∑ FEi
t
i=1
FE̅̅̅̅
⁄ )P2 +
P3(
FEt
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
⁄ )P4 + (
P1P2
FE̅̅ ̅̅
(
∑ FEi
t
i=1
FE̅̅̅̅
⁄ )
P2−1
+
P3P4
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
(
FEt
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
⁄ )P4−1)FEt)} 
DD={L0 (1 −
FEt
φ
ϑ
)
ε1
At
ε1Kt
αε1−ε2lPL
ε1−αε1−ε1γLt
ε2−αε1−γε1γε1FEt
ρ−1
((ACtCE)
ρ + FEt
ρ
)
γε1
ρ⁄ −1 −
L0
ϑε1
φ
FEt
φ
ϑ−1
(1 −
FEt
φ
ϑ
)
ε1−1
At
ε1Kt
αε1−ε2lPL
ε1−αε1−ε1γLt
ε2−αε1−γε1 
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And the above equation, when there is no fossil fuel energy left to use, is: 
−β2Ct+1
1−σLt+1
σ−2 +  β2
Ct+1
−σ
Lt+1
1−σ {(1 − α − γ)(At+1Kt+1
α (lPL)
1−α−γ(Lt+1)
−α−γ)(ACt+1CE)
γ} +
 
β2
Ct+1
−σ
Lt+1
1−σ
ωAC0ACt+1
θ (lTLLt+1)ωTYt+1
ω−1 {ωAC0ACt+1
θ (lTLTYt+1)
ωLt+1
ω−1} +
β
Ct
−σ
Lt
1−σ− β
2 Ct+1
−σ
Lt+1
1−σ(α(At+1Kt+1
α−1(lPLLt+1)
1−α−γ)(ACt+1CE)
γ+1−δ)
(αε1−ε2)L0At+1
ε1 Kt+1
αε1−ε2−1lPL
ε1−αε1−ε1γLt+1
ε2−αε1−γε1(ACt+1CE)γε1
∗ {L0(ε2 − αε1 −
γε1)At+1
ε1 Kt+1
αε1−ε2lPL
ε1−αε1−ε1γLt+1
ε2−αε1−γε1−1(ACt+1CE)
γε1 + 1} =
 
Ct−1
−σ
Lt−1
1−σ− β
Ct
−σ
Lt
1−σ(α(AtKt
α−1(lPLLt)
1−α−γ)(ACtCE)
γ+1−δ)
(αε1−ε2)L0At
ε1Kt
αε1−ε2−1lPL
ε1−αε1−ε1γLt
ε2−αε1−γε1(ACtCE)γε1
      (C26) 
β
Ct+1
−σ
Lt+1
1−σ {(1 −
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
) α(At+1Kt+1
α−1(lPLLt+1)
1−α−γ)((ACt+1CE)
ρ + FEt+1
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ + 1 − δ} +
(
EE
FF
) {(αε1 − ε2)L0 (1 −
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
)
ε1
At+1
ε1 Kt+1
αε1−ε2−1lPL
ε1−αε1−ε1γLt+1
ε2−αε1−γε1((ACt+1CE)
ρ +
FEt+1
ρ
)
γε1
ρ⁄ =
Ct
−σ
Lt
1−σ          (C27) 
EE=−β
Ct+1
−σ
Lt+1
1−σ {(1 −
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
) (At+1Kt+1
α (lPLLt+1)
1−α−γ)γFEt+1
ρ−1
((ACt+1CE)
ρ + FEt+1
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ −1 −
ϑ
φ
FEt+1
φ
ϑ−1
(At+1Kt+1
α (lPLLt+1)
1−α−γ)((ACt+1CE)
ρ + FEt+1
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ − (P0 + P1(
∑ FEi
t+1
i=1
FE̅̅̅̅
⁄ )P2 +
P3(
FEt+1
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
⁄ )P4 + (
P1P2
FE̅̅ ̅̅
(
∑ FEi
t+1
i=1
FE̅̅̅̅
⁄ )
P2−1
+
P3P4
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
(
FEt+1
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
⁄ )P4−1)FEt+1)} 
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FF={L0 (1 −
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
)
ε1
At+1
ε1 Kt+1
αε1−ε2lPL
ε1−αε1−ε1γLt+1
ε2−αε1−γε1γε1FEt+1
ρ−1
((ACt+1CE)
ρ +
FEt+1
ρ
)
γε1
ρ⁄ −1 − L0
ϑε1
φ
FEt+1
φ
ϑ−1
(1 −
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
)
ε1−1
At+1
ε1 Kt+1
αε1−ε2lPL
ε1−αε1−ε1γLt+1
ε2−αε1−γε1((ACt+1CE)
ρ + FEt+1
ρ
)
γε1
ρ⁄ } 
β
Ct+1
−σ
Lt+1
1−σ {(1 −
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
) At+1Kt+1
α (lPLLt+1)
1−α−γγCEρACt+1
ρ−1
((ACt+1CE)
ρ + FEt+1
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ −1} +
β
Ct+1
−σ
Lt+1
1−σ
ωAC0ACt+1
θ (lTLLt+1)ωTYt+1
ω−1 {θAC0ACt+1
θ−1(lTLLt+1TYt+1)
ω} + (
GG
HH
) {γε1CE
ρACt+1
ρ−1
L0 (1 −
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
)
ε1
At+1
ε1 Kt+1
αε1−ε2lPL
ε1−αε1−ε1γLt+1
ε2−αε1−γε1((ACt+1CE)
ρ + FEt+1
ρ
)
γε1
ρ⁄ −1} =
Ct
−σ
Lt
1−σ
ωAC0ACt
θ(lTLLt)ωTYt
ω−1           (C28) 
GG=−β
Ct+1
−σ
Lt+1
1−σ {(1 −
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
) (At+1Kt+1
α (lPLLt+1)
1−α−γ)γFEt+1
ρ−1
((ACt+1CE)
ρ + FEt+1
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ −1 −
ϑ
φ
FEt+1
φ
ϑ−1
(At+1Kt+1
α (lPLLt+1)
1−α−γ)((ACt+1CE)
ρ + FEt+1
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ − (P0 + P1(
∑ FEi
t+1
i=1
FE̅̅̅̅
⁄ )P2 +
P3(
FEt+1
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
⁄ )P4 + (
P1P2
FE̅̅ ̅̅
(
∑ FEi
t+1
i=1
FE̅̅̅̅
⁄ )
P2−1
+
P3P4
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
(
FEt+1
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
⁄ )P4−1)FEt+1)} 
HH={L0 (1 −
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
)
ε1
At+1
ε1 Kt+1
αε1−ε2lPL
ε1−αε1−ε1γLt+1
ε2−αε1−γε1γε1FEt+1
ρ−1
((ACt+1CE)
ρ +
FEt+1
ρ
)
γε1
ρ⁄ −1 − L0
ϑε1
φ
FEt+1
φ
ϑ−1
(1 −
FEt+1
φ
ϑ
)
ε1−1
At+1
ε1 Kt+1
αε1−ε2lPL
ε1−αε1−ε1γLt+1
ε2−αε1−γε1((ACt+1CE)
ρ + FEt+1
ρ
)
γε1
ρ⁄ } 
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And the above equation, when there is no fossil fuel energy left to use, will be: 
β
Ct+1
−σ
Lt+1
1−σ {At+1Kt+1
α (lPLLt+1)
1−α−γγCE(ACt+1CE)
γ−1} +
β
Ct+1
−σ
Lt+1
1−σ
ωAC0ACt+1
θ (lTLLt+1)ωTYt+1
ω−1 {θAC0ACt+1
θ−1(lTLLt+1TYt+1)
ω} +
β
Ct
−σ
Lt
1−σ− β
2 Ct+1
−σ
Lt+1
1−σ(α(At+1Kt+1
α−1(lPLLt+1)
1−α−γ)(ACt+1CE)
γ+1−δ)
(αε1−ε2)L0At+1
ε1 Kt+1
αε1−ε2−1lPL
ε1−αε1−ε1γLt+1
ε2−αε1−γε1(ACt+1CE)γε1
∗
(γε1L0At
ε1Kt
αε1−ε2lPL
ε1−αε1−ε1γLt
ε2−αε1−γε1CEγε1ACt
γε1−1) =
Ct
−σ
Lt
1−σ
ωAC0ACt
θ(lTLLt)ωTYt
ω−1   (C29) 
Solving the market-based F.O.C 
Solving the first-order conditions for households, we get: 
{ct}: β
t Ct
−σ
Lt
1−σ = λ1t          (C30) 
{Kt+1}: λ1t = (1 + rt+1)λ1t+1        (C31) 
{Lt+1}: β
t+1
Ct+1
1−σ
Lt+1
2−σ = λ1t+1wt+1 − λ2t + λ2t+1(1 + L̅) 
And when the population grows endogenously, we have the below F.O.C: 
{Kt+1}: λ1t = (1 + rt+1)λ1t+1 − λ2t+1ε2L0Lt+1
ε2−ε1Yt+1
ε1 Kt+1
−ε2−1    (C32) 
{Lt+1}: β
t+1 Ct+1
1−σ
Lt+1
2−σ = λ1t+1wt+1 − λ2t + λ2t+1(1 + L0(ε2 − ε1)Yt+1
ε1 Kt+1
−ε2Lt+1
ε2−ε1−1) (C33) 
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Updating and substituting Equations C30 in C31, C32, and C33 we derive the Euler equations 
for households for both cases: 
Ct
−σ
Lt
1−σ = β(1 + rt+1)
Ct+1
−σ
Lt+1
1−σ   (Population is exogenous)   (C34) 
β2
Ct+1
1−σ
Lt+1
2−σ = β
2 Ct+1
−σ
Lt+1
1−σ wt+1 −
[(1+rt)β
Ct
−σ
Lt
1−σ−
Ct−1
−σ
Lt−1
1−σ]
[ε2L0Lt
ε2−ε1Yt
ε1Kt
−ε2−1]
+
[(1+rt+1)β
2 Ct+1
−σ
Lt+1
1−σ−β
Ct
−σ
Lt
1−σ]
[ε2L0Lt+1
ε2−ε1Yt+1
ε1 Kt+1
−ε2−1]
(1 + L0(ε2 −
ε1)Yt+1
ε1 Kt+1
−ε2Lt+1
ε2−ε1−1)    (Population is endogenous)   (C35) 
Solving the first-order conditions for the final good market, we have: 
{KYt}: αEDAtKYt
α−1PLt
1−α−γ(CEt
ρ
+ FEt
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ = rt + δ     (C36) 
{PLt}: (1 − α − γ)EDAtKYt
αPLt
−α−γ(CEt
ρ
+ FEt
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ = wt    (C37) 
{FEt}: γEDAtKYt
αPLt
1−α−γFEt
ρ−1
(CEt
ρ
+ FEt
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ −1 = PFEt    (C38) 
{CEt}: γEDAtKYt
αPLt
1−α−γCEt
ρ−1
(CEt
ρ
+ FEt
ρ
)
γ
ρ⁄ −1 = PCEt    (C39) 
In the end, the F.O.C.s for the energy sector are: 
{FEt}: P0 + P1(
∑ FEi
t
i=1
FE̅̅̅̅
⁄ )P2 + P3(
FEt
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
⁄ )P4 + (
P1P2
FE̅̅ ̅̅
(
∑ FEi
t
i=1
FE̅̅̅̅
⁄ )
P2−1
+
P3P4
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
(
FEt
CTE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
⁄ )P4−1)FEt = PFEt        (C40) 
{TLt}: λtωAC0ACt
θTYt(TLtTYt)
ω−1 = βtwt       (C41) 
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{TYt}: λtωAC0ACt
θTLt(TLtTYt)
ω−1 = βtrt      (C42) 
{ACt+1}: λt − λt+1AC0ACt
θ(TLtTYt)
ω = βt+1CE ∗ PCEt+1     (C43) 
Combining Equations C41 and C42, we get: 
TYt =
wt
rt
TLt          (C44) 
Updating and substituting Equation C44 into C43, we get another Euler equation for the 
Energy sector: 
wt
ωAC0ACt
θTYt(TLtTYt)ω−1
− βCE ∗ PCEt+1 =  
βwt+1
ωACt+1
θ TYt+1(TLt+1TYt+1)ω−1
ACt
θ(TLtTYt)
ω  (C45) 
Using Equations C38 and C40, we derive the price and the amount of fossil fuel energy.  
Price of fossil fuel energy 
In this setup for simplicity, a social planner needs to provide non-renewable energy (while she 
owns it). Thus she needs to spend some of her resources to extract it. In the market-based approach, 
the energy sector (as a monopoly) owns the resources but still needs to pay the extraction costs. 
This cost is similar in both models (social planner and market-based). However, unlike Stiglitz 
assumption in which cost of extraction is decreasing over time, in this model, it is increasing over 
time since it would be harder to extract the fossil fuel in the bottom of a reservoir (and when there 
is less energy reserve remains in the reservoir) compared to the full reservoir. Another distinction 
of this model versus Stiglitz (or in general Hotelling setup) is that the objective in those models is 
understanding a social planner should utilize the exhaustible resources. In the current setup, the 
purpose is how social planner should maximize household utility, which is the consumption per 
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capita. And consumption itself is a function of different investments. In the end, it is noteworthy 
that if there is a strong and positive correlation between marginal cost and the price of fossil fuel, 
then that suggests the price of price fossil fuel has been increasing during the past decades while 
at the same time energy utilization has been increasing as well. 
 
Figure 6:  Total fossil fuel consumption in the U.S. from 1960 – 2012. As it is shown, the rate of 
consumption/production has been increasing while the price of providing it has also been growing. 
Changing the capital share 
In this section, I want to investigate two simple cases as a sensitivity analysis. First, the 
capital changes from 0.27 to 0.21. Second, an extra element would be added to the income 
allocation equation (Equation 3) to absorb the gap between the perfect income allocation of the 
model and the imperfect allocation of the real world (such as retirement, labor force 
participation, which is not 100% and so on). Therefore, instead of Equation 3, we will have: 
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Yt = Ct + Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt + PFEtFEt + TYt + Mist     (E1) 
The results—for the social planner approach when the population grows endogenously—are 
depicted in Figure 7. We can see that the economic growth is lower when there is a misallocation 
in income, and population tends to grow even faster. However, population growth is slower 
when capital share decreases ad labor share increases. 
Figure 7 shows population growth and economic growth for three different cases. The blue lines show 
the base scenario when there is no misallocation of resources and the capital share is 0.27. Red lines show 
the case in which labor share increases by 6 percent. The yellow lines show that there exist 25% 
misallocation of the income. The social planner solution has been applied for all models. 
 
Figure 7: Population growth and economic growth for three different scenarios. 
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Altering the population growth 
One would argue that the U.S. population grows around one percent, whereas, in the proposed 
model it converges to zero. Because of this, I have used different parameterization for Equation 
15 (Lt+1 = Lt + L0(
Yt
Lt
⁄ )ε1(
Lt
Kt
⁄ )ε2), to see if one percent growth rate in population is 
achievable using the current setup. As it is shown in Figure 7, a population can grow faster in the 
observed period’s early stages; however, it tends to drop towards end. While the proposed model 
is well-fitted in Japan and Western European countries, we need to change the value of the 
parameters in Equation 15 (ε1 = 1.72 → 1.8 , ε2 = 2.18 → 2.1 and L0 = 2.35 → 12.35) to 
capture the growth rate in population for US.  
For the case of the US, I can think of a plausible argument. If we deduct US immigration rate 
(including immigrants’ descendants, although they might be the U.S.-born), the population growth 
would be much lower than the current rate. Although the counter argument would be that they still 
participate in the economy, however, they are not born in that economy but are brought in. The 
proposed model shows a high growth rate in early stages, so we can think about the entrance of 
immigrants with the high rate of population which, tends to converge to its steady state.  
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Figure 8: Economic growth for two different scenarios of population growth. 
Figure 8 shows population and economic growth for two different scenarios of population growth. The 
blue lines show the base model scenario in which population grows at 0.02 percent rate. The red lines match 
the U.S. population growth which is about 0.6 percent on average. The social planner solution has been 
applied for both models. 
Assigning different utility function 
In another attempt, instead of exogenously imposing a social cost of using the fossil fuel-based 
energy, we can tweak the individuals’ utility function in such a way that they evaluate the air 
quality (the environment in general) as another good. Under these conditions, the utility 
maximization process is:   
Max W = E0 ∑ β
t (ct
μ
EDt
1−μ)1−σ
1−σ
T
t=0   ct =
Ct
Lt
⁄     (G1&G2) 
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The only difference in the above household maximization setting, compared to the social 
planner approach, is the idea arising from Rosen (1974) in which individuals evaluate the air 
quality as a commodity and add it to their consumption bundle accordingly. Since households 
would profit from firms, ultimately, air quality is endogenous within this setup. In the above 
setting, if individuals do not care for the environment, we can simply calibrate the value of µ to 
one. Thus, we get the same utility as we had before. Based on the degree of the individuals’ 
awareness of the importance of the environment, this amount would be somewhere between zero 
and one. Updating Equations C34 and C35 by including the environmental degradation we have: 
EDt
(1−μ)(1−σ)Ct
μ−μσ−1Lt
μσ−μ = β(1 + rt+1)EDt+1
(1−μ)(1−σ)Ct+1
μ−μσ−1Lt+1
μσ−μ
  (G3) 
β2EDt
(1−μ)(1−σ)Ct
μ−μσLt
μσ−μ−1 = β2EDt+1
(1−μ)(1−σ)Ct+1
μ−μσ−1Lt+1
μσ−μwt+1 −
[(1+rt)βEDt
(1−μ)(1−σ)Ct
μ−μσ−1
Lt
μσ−μ
−EDt−1
(1−μ)(1−σ)Ct−1
μ−μσ−1
Lt−1
μσ−μ
]
[ε2L0Lt
ε2−ε1Yt
ε1Kt
−ε2−1]
+
[(1+rt+1)β
2EDt+1
(1−μ)(1−σ)Ct+1
μ−μσ−1
Lt+1
μσ−μ
−βEDt
(1−μ)(1−σ)Ct
μ−μσ−1
Lt
μσ−μ
]
[ε2L0Lt+1
ε2−ε1Yt+1
ε1 Kt+1
−ε2−1]
(1 + L0(ε2 −
ε1)Yt+1
ε1 Kt+1
−ε2Lt+1
ε2−ε1−1)          (G4)  
The results are summarized in Figure 9. Households tend to consume less in the 
environmental friendly model compared to the others. However, it does not have any impact on 
fossil fuel production pattern.   
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Figure 9: Population growth and fossil fuel utilization for the environmental friendly model. 
Figure 9 shows population growth and fossil fuel utilization for three different scenarios. The blue lines 
are for the base model. The red lines show the elements when there is an element of carbon tax. And the 
yellow lines show when individuals evaluate environment as another good in their utility maximization. All 
models are decentralized. 
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Appendix to Chapter II 
Table 7: The summary statistics of the respondents 
Item # Observation      Description                
Amount 
Control Treat-1 Treat-2 Treat-3 
Occupation 665 
Faculty 26.53% 29.93% 30.38% 35.51% 30.14% 
Staff 43.54% 43.54% 41.77% 31.31% 43.84% 
Student 29.93% 26.53% 27.85% 33.18% 26.03% 
Gender 664 
Female 61.75% 60.54% 64.97% 58.41% 64.38% 
Male 38.25% 39.46% 35.03% 41.59% 35.62% 
Education 665 
High school 8.43% 8.16% 5.06% 11.68% 7.53% 
Some college 15.81% 13.61% 16.46% 16.82% 15.75% 
College degree 23.80% 25.85% 24.05% 23.83% 21.92% 
Post-grad 
degree 
51.96% 52.38% 54.43% 47.66% 54.79% 
Birth place 665 
US born 85.86% 85.03% 81.65% 87.38% 89.04% 
Foreign born 14.14% 14.97% 18.35% 12.62% 10.96% 
Marital 
status 
662 
Divorced 10.12% 8.84% 12.10% 8.92% 11.03% 
Married 46.37% 46.94% 47.13% 46.01% 45.52% 
Never married 40.79% 42.86% 36.94 41.31% 42.07% 
Separated 1.21% 0.00% 1.27% 2.35% 0.69% 
Widowed 1.51% 1.36% 2.55% 1.41% 0.69% 
# Kids 664 
None 54.22% 53.74% 50.96% 53.27% 59.59% 
1 or 2 33.88% 31.29% 36.94% 35.98% 30.14% 
3 or more 11.90% 14.97% 12.10% 10.75% 10.27% 
Age 643 
Mean 40.3 40.3 40.5 40.5 39.9 
Std. Deviation 14.7 14.7 14.2 14.9 14.9 
Median 40 39 40.5 42 39 
Min 18 18 18 18 18 
Max 75 75 73 75 75 
Income 550 
Mean 52,966 48,996 59,379 53,077 50,875 
Std. Deviation 43,817 30,900 59,425 39,727 40,723 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 500,000 
 
150,000 500,000 180,000 240,000 
Sign the petition 
             
665 
Yes 67.52% 62.59% 55.06% 77.10% 71.92% 
No 32.48% 37.41% 44.94% 22.90% 28.08% 
Number 665 147 158 214 146 
If sign which tax 
             
449 
10% Carbon tax 72.61% 72.83% 72.41% 69.70% 77.14% 
1% sales tax 27.39% 27.17% 27.59% 30.30% 22.86% 
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Table 8: Probit analysis to determine any attribute impacts on the individuals’ decisions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Sign the petition Sign the petition Sign the petition 
Treatment 1 -0.194 -0.212 -0.297 
 (0.14535) (0.15090) (0.16729) 
    
Treatment 2 0.421** 0.426** 0.310 
 (0.14183) (0.14705) (0.16332) 
    
Treatment 3 0.260 0.229 0.0973 
 (0.15265) (0.15754) (0.17395) 
    
Age - -0.0132* -0.00888 
  (0.00522) (0.00596) 
    
Occupation - 0.223* 0.263* 
  (0.10813) (0.11597) 
    
Education - 0.104 0.115 
  (0.07470) (0.08220) 
    
Income - - 1.84e-08 
   (0.00000) 
    
Controls* No Yes Yes 
N 665 638 535 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
*Other controls are: gender, marital status, number of the kids, and birth place. 
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 Table 9: Probit analysis to determine any attribute impacts on the individuals’ tax plan (sales tax) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Sales Tax Sales Tax Sales Tax 
Treatment 1 0.0124 0.00368 -0.00352 
 (0.20050) (0.20703) (0.22071) 
    
Treatment 2 0.0919 0.0726 0.0227 
 (0.17352) (0.17783) (0.18958) 
    
Treatment 3 -0.136 -0.113 -0.0713 
 (0.19487) (0.19941) (0.21196) 
    
Age  -0.00118 0.00102 
  (0.00666) (0.00741) 
    
Occupation - 0.000373 -0.0312 
  (0.13020) (0.14122) 
    
Education - -0.0456 -0.0745 
  (0.09680) (0.10538) 
    
Income - - 0.000000531 
   (0.00000) 
    
Controls* No Yes Yes 
N 449 434 375 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
*Other controls are: gender, marital status, number of the kids, and birth place. 
 
Table 10: Power analysis among different groups 
ANALYSIS TOTAL SAMPLE ALPHA POWER 
C VS T1 1029 0.05 0.8 
C VS T2 192 0.05 0.8 
T1 VS T2 92 0.05 0.8 
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Survey 
Participation in research is voluntary.  You do not have to be in this study.  If you decide to be 
in the study and change your mind, you have the right to drop out at any time.  You may skip 
questions or stop participating at any time.  Whatever you decide, you will not lose any benefits to 
which you are otherwise entitled. 
If you are willing to volunteer for this research, please continue with the survey. 
Personal Background Information  
1. What is your gender (Female, male): 
2. What is your age: 
3. What is your occupation (Faculty, staff, student): 
4. What is your yearly income: 
5. What is the highest completed degree you have earned (High school grad, some college, 
college grad, postgrad degree): 
6. Are you the US-born or Foreign-born: 
7. What is your marital status (Married, never married, divorced, widowed or separated): 
8. How many kids do you have (None, 1 or 2, 3 or more): 
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US Energy and Carbon emission information, and environmental issues 
Now, we are going to give you some information on energy consumption in the United States: 
Primary Energy Consumption in the US by Source and Sector in 2014 
Table S.1: US Sources of Energy.  
Source Petroleum Natural gas Coal Renewable Nuclear 
Power 
% of Total 
Use 
35.5% 28.0% 18.2% 9.8% 8.5% 
Use in 
Sector 
Transportation 
& Industrial 
Industrial & 
Electrical Power 
Electrical 
Power 
Electrical 
Power 
Electrical 
Power 
As it is shown in Table above, more than 80% of the US energy consumption supplies by 
fossil-based energy, which produces more than 15 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide. To give 
you an idea about the magnitude of this amount, the forests required to sequester the produced 
carbon every year in the US, is more than 15 times of the existing forests in the US!  
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Carbon emissions from coal are about 25 times more than solar PV to produce the same 
amount to generate electricity; and more than double about natural gas; and still around one-fifth 
of the total energy produces by coal because it is marginally cheaper and available, excluding the 
environmental damages it causes. 
Below is the Energy Consumption Comparison between the three different treatment 
groups: 
1- US vs. EU: 
Table below shows energy-type use in the US and the European countries. We can see while 
less than 20% of the total energy production of the US is provided by renewable energy and 
nuclear power (we can call it clean energy); the European countries utilize more than 50% of 
their energy production from the clean energy.  
Table S.2: US vs. EU Energy Use. 
     Countries Renewable/Nuclear Energy 
Fossil-based Energy (Oil/natural 
gas/coal) 
US 18.3% 81.7% 
EU-28 54.9% 45.1% 
The below graphical bar shows the energy production ratio between clean energy and fossil fuel 
energy for the US and EU countries. 
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2- US vs. China: 
Table below shows energy-type use in the US and China. We can see while less than 20% of 
the total energy production of the US is provided by renewable energy and nuclear power (we 
can call it clean energy); China even utilizes less than us; about 11% of their energy production 
comes from the clean energy.  
Table S.3: US vs. China Energy Use. 
     Countries Renewable/Nuclear Energy Fossil-based Energy (Oil/natural gas/coal) 
US 18.3% 81.7% 
China 11.0% 89.0% 
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US EU-28
Energy Consumption Comparison
Nuclear & Renewable Energy Fossil Fuel
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The below graphical bar shows the energy production ratio between clean energy and fossil fuel 
energy for the US and China. 
 
 
 
3- US, EU, and China: 
Table below shows energy-type use in the US, the European countries, and China. We can see 
while less than 20% of the total energy production of the US is provided by renewable energy 
and nuclear power (we can call it clean energy). The European countries utilize more than 50% 
of their energy production from the clean energy; while this ratio is about 11% for China which 
is even less than The US. 
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Table S.4: US, EU and China Energy Use Comparison. 
     Countries 
Renewable/Nuclear 
Energy 
Fossil-based Energy (Oil/natural 
gas/coal) 
US 18.3% 81.7% 
EU-28 54.9% 45.1% 
China 11.0% 89.0% 
The below graphical bar shows the energy production ratio between clean energy and fossil fuel 
energy for the US, EU countries, and China. 
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Tax Reform Petition 
As climate change becomes increasingly recognized as the key environmental issue of our 
times, there is an overwhelming scientific consensus that only a substantial reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions can reduce the risks and impacts associated with climate change. To 
achieve meaningful reductions, we will need to change our energy use patterns. One of the more 
immediate but costly paths to accomplish this is to change energy-based resources. To do that, 
we want Governor Deal to consider the current tax reform petition to either  
1. Impose ten percent carbon pollution tax on the fossil-based power plants and industries, 
and, with the generated income, subsidizes the renewable/nuclear energy users. A carbon tax is 
an extra fee for making users of fossil fuels pay for climate damage their fuel use imposes by 
releasing CO2 into the air and for motivating switches to clean energy because it increases the 
cost of power production and incentivizes the producers to change the energy sources.   
or  
2. Increase one percent sales tax to subsidize renewable/nuclear energy users.      
Will you sign the petition in either case (Yes/No)? 
If your answer is yes, which of the Tax Reform do you prefer (1/2)? 
 
Thank You! 
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Appendix to Chapter III 
 
Figure 10: Percentage of Fossil fuel energy to total energy consumption, Air pollution (PM10), total 
crime rates, and death rate in the US from 2001 to 2015. 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Illustrating the applied empirical model, and the channels of the impacts of each variable on 
crime and mortality rate 
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Table 11: Summary statistics of the main variables in the model (2001-2015, N=765). 
 
State level data 
Type Variable Unit Mean SD Min Max 
Energy-
Independent 
variables 
Total Energy 
Consumption 
Million 
BTU* 
662968 633394 2812 5887435 
Fossil fuel-based 
Energy 
Million 
BTU 
402,188 335,504 2,812 2,039,651 
Coal-based Energy 
Million 
BTU 
53,680 49,714 0 229,746 
Clean Energy** 
Million 
BTU 
261,218 363,598 0 384,7784 
Air Pollution 
and Income-
Mechanisms 
PM 10*** 
Microgram 
in cubic meter 
8.493 11.918 0 68.798 
Average Income  US $ 55,586 8,612 32,338 80,007 
Controls 
Population No. 5,956,581 6,680,050 494,423 3.9e+07 
Police Officers No. 19,030 22,951 1,238 123,506 
Unemployment Rate Percentage 6.013 1.998 2.6 13.7 
House Price Index 
Average 
price change 
1.551 0.355 0.954 3.564 
Social 
damages-
dependent 
variables 
Property Crime No. 186,570 214,507 8,806 1,227,194 
Violent Crime No. 25,892 33,789 493 212,855 
Mortality  No. 48,858 49,179 2,974 259,206 
Circulatory Death-
cause 
No. 16,361 17,331 797 93,373 
* One unit of MMBTU equals 293 KWH 
** It is combined of solar, hydro, wind, nuclear, biofuel energy 
*** PM 10 uses as a proxy for air pollution in this study 
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Table 12: Basic results for the raw analysis.  
 Energy: Total Energy: Fossil fuel-based Energy: Coal-based 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Violent 
Crime 
Mortalit
y 
Violent 
Crime 
Mortalit
y 
Violent 
Crime 
Mortality 
Total Energy 0.00169** 0.00067
6*** 
    
 (0.001) (0.000)     
Fossil fuel-
based 
  0.00177* 0.00077
4** 
  
   (0.001) (0.000)   
Coal-based     0.00287 0.00239** 
     (0.002) (0.001) 
       
Pollution 1.043** 0.194 1.128*** 0.226 1.165*** 0.235 
 (0.335) (0.128) (0.335) (0.130) (0.340) (0.130) 
       
Income -0.000328 -
0.000985** 
-0.000303 -
0.000983** 
-0.000188 -
0.000976** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
       
Police officers 0.282** -0.0291 0.319*** -0.0143 0.322*** -0.0113 
 (0.095) (0.040) (0.095) (0.039) (0.096) (0.040) 
       
Housing price 16.93 -3.829 17.15 -3.662 14.80 -4.567 
 (13.754) (6.526) (13.915) (6.518) (14.133) (6.522) 
       
Unemployme
nt 
-7.416* -
4.300*** 
-7.927** -4.481*** -8.343** -4.658*** 
 (3.005) (1.191) (3.044) (1.184) (3.073) (1.183) 
       
Year -7.091*** 0.596 -6.289*** 0.894 -5.708*** 1.126 
 (1.176) (0.625) (1.104) (0.606) (1.095) (0.594) 
       
Fixed 
effects** 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 765 765 764 764 764 764 
R2 0.94 0.98 0.93 0.98 0.93 0.98 
Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables, respectively, are total energy consumption 
per capita*, fossil fuel energy consumption per capita, and coal consumption per capita in each state 
(which are depicted on the top rows of the Table); and the dependent variables are divided into two 
categories: violent crime rates and death rates. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
* Energy elements, number of the police officers, number of the crimes and deaths, are normalized per 
hundred thousand of residents    
** State and year fixed effects 
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Table 13: Basic results for the mechanism approach (air pollution is the mechanism, dependent 
variable is the violent crime)*. 
 Energy: Fossil fuel-based Energy: Coal-based 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Violent 
Crime 
Air 
Pollution 
Violent 
Crime 
Violent  
Crime 
Air 
Pollution 
Violent 
Crime 
Fossil fuel-
based 
0.00191* 0.000123* 0.00177*    
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)    
Coal-based    0.00356 0.000592 0.00287 
    (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) 
       
Air Pollution   1.128***   1.165*** 
   (0.335)   (0.340) 
       
Controls** Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 764 764 764 764 764 764 
R2 0.93 0.84 0.93 0.93 0.84 0.93 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
* Variables have been normalized per 100,000 residents 
** Housing prices, number of the police officers, rate of unemployment, income, year trend, state and 
year fixed effects 
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Table 14: Basic results for the mechanism approach (income is the mechanism, dependent variable is 
the violent crime)*. 
 Energy: Fossil fuel-based Energy: Coal-based 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Violent 
Crime 
Income 
Violent 
Crime 
Violent  Crime Income 
Violent 
Crime 
Fossil fuel-
based 
0.00175* 0.0785** 0.00177*    
 (0.001) (0.028) (0.001)    
Coal-based    0.00277 0.548*** 0.00287 
    (0.002) (0.137) (0.002) 
       
Income   -0.000303   -0.000188 
   (0.001)   (0.001) 
       
Controls** Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 764 764 764 764 764 764 
R2 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
* Variables have been normalized per 100,000 residents 
** Housing prices, number of the police officers, rate of unemployment, air pollution, year trend, state 
and year fixed effects 
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Table 15: Basic results for the mechanism approach (air pollution is the mechanism, dependent 
variable is the mortality rate)*. 
 Energy: Fossil fuel-based Energy: Coal-based 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Mortalit
y 
Air Pollution Mortality Mortality 
Air 
Pollution 
Mortality 
Fossil fuel-
based 
0.00080
2** 
0.000123* 0.000774**    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Coal-based    0.00253** 0.000592 0.00239** 
    (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
       
Air Pollution   0.226   0.235 
   (0.130)   (0.130) 
       
Controls** Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 764 764 764 764 764 764 
R2 0.98 0.84 0.98 0.98 0.84 0.98 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
* Variables have been normalized per 100,000 residents 
** Housing prices, number of the police officers, rate of unemployment, income, year trend, state and 
year fixed effects 
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Table 16: Basic results for the mechanism approach (income is the mechanism, dependent variable is 
the mortality rate)*. 
 Energy: Fossil fuel-based Energy: Coal-based 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Mortality Income Mortality Mortality Income Mortality 
Fossil fuel-
based 
0.000697** 0.0785** 0.000774**    
 (0.000) (0.028) (0.000)    
Coal-based    0.00186* 0.548*** 0.00239** 
    (0.001) (0.137) (0.001) 
       
Income   -0.000983**   -0.000976** 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
       
Controls** Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 764 764 764 764 764 764 
R2 0.98 0.93 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.98 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
* Variables have been normalized per 100,000 residents 
** Housing prices, number of the police officers, rate of unemployment, air pollution, year trend, state 
and year fixed effects 
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Table 17: IV approach using political affiliation to predict the energy variables*. 
 Energy: Fossil fuel-based Energy: Coal-based 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Violent Crime Mortality Violent Crime Mortality 
Fossil fuel-
based 
-0.0157 -0.0149   
 (0.027) (0.018)   
Coal-based   -0.0386 -0.0366 
   (0.050) (0.027) 
     
Air Pollution 1.672 0.714 1.430** 0.484* 
 (0.989) (0.587) (0.507) (0.207) 
     
Income 0.00191 0.000995 0.00139 0.000507 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
     
Controls** Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 764 764 764 764 
R2 0.83 0.88 0.91 0.96 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
* Variables have been normalized per 100,000 residents 
** Housing prices, number of the police officers, rate of unemployment, year trend, state and year 
fixed effects 
  
118 
 
Table 18: Altonji Table, while the dependent variable is violent crime rate. 
 
Energy: Fossil Fuel-based  Energy: Coal-based 
Energy Uncontrolled Controlled* Uncontrolled Controlled* 
Coefficient -0.00114 0.00177 -0.02674 0.00287 
R-Squared 0.005 0.934 0.066 0.933 
Delta -2.58065 -0.27467 
* In this analysis, income and pollution are also have been considered as control variables (beside 
housing prices, rate of unemployment, number of the police officers, year trend, State and year fixed 
effects).  
 
 
Table 19: Altonji Table, while the dependent variable is mortality rate. 
 
Energy: Fossil Fuel-based Energy: Coal-based 
Energy Uncontrolled Controlled* Uncontrolled Controlled* 
Coefficient -0.00085 0.00077 0.02422 0.00239 
R-Squared 0.004 0.983 0.068 0.983 
Delta -6.71506 1.17395 
* In this analysis, income and pollution are also have been considered as control variables (beside 
housing prices, rate of unemployment, number of the police officers, year trend, State and year fixed 
effects). 
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Table 20: Placebo test using the elements similar to the dependent variable, while the dependent 
variables are violent crime and property crime rates*. 
 Energy: Fossil fuel-based Energy: Coal-based 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Violent Crime Property Crime Violent Crime Property  Crime 
Fossil fuel-
based 
0.00177* 0.00512**   
 (0.0008) (0.0017)   
Coal-based   0.00287 0.00789 
   (0.0018) (0.0102) 
     
Air Pollution 1.128*** -2.319 1.165*** -2.210 
 (0.3345) (1.4125) (0.3396) (1.4248) 
     
Income -0.000303 -0.00432 -0.000188 -0.00397 
 (0.0007) (0.0035) (0.0007) (0.0036) 
     
Controls** Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
     
Fixed 
effects*** 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
N 764 764 764 764 
R2 0.934 0.935 0.933 0.935 
Standard errors in parentheses  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
* Variables have been normalized per 100,000 residents 
** Housing prices, number of the police officers, rate of unemployment, and year trend 
*** State and year fixed effects 
  
120 
 
Table 21: Placebo test using the elements similar to the dependent variable, while the dependent 
variables are circulatory cause and external causes of death*. 
 Energy: Fossil fuel-based Energy: Coal-based 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Circulatory External Circulatory External 
Fossil fuel-
based 
0.000323 0.000147***   
 (0.0002) (0.0000)   
Coal-based   0.00111* 0.000486* 
   (0.0004) (0.0002) 
     
Air Pollution 0.289*** -0.0886** 0.292*** -0.0871** 
 (0.0634) (0.0300) (0.0635) (0.0304) 
     
Income -0.000513** -0.0000110 -0.000514** -0.0000108 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
     
Controls** Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
     
Fixed 
effects*** 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
N 764 764 764 764 
R2 0.979 0.939 0.979 0.938 
Standard errors in parentheses  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
* Variables have been normalized per 100,000 residents 
** Housing prices, number of the police officers, rate of unemployment, and year trend 
*** State and year fixed effects 
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Table 22: Test for the endogeneity of the error terms for the violent crime and mortality rate using the 
Imai et al. (2010) sensitivity method. 
 Violent Crime Mortality 
 Mechanism:  
Air Pollution 
Mechanism: 
Income 
Mechanism:  
Air Pollution 
Mechanism: 
Income  𝜀3j 𝜀3j 𝜀3j 𝜀3j 
𝜀2i 0.187 0.187 0.187 0.187 
 (0.3948) (0.3948) (0.3948) (0.3948) 
     
N 764 764 764 764 
R2 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.953 
Standard errors in parentheses  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 23: Testing for income effect to verify whether the high income states are different in 
environmental policy and energy subsidy compared to the lower income states*. 
 High Income States** Low Income States All the States 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Violent 
Crime 
Mortal
ity 
Violent 
Crime 
Mortali
ty 
Violent 
Crime 
Mortality 
Coal-based 
Energy 
0.00242 0.0012
4 
0.00917 0.0095
5* 
0.00287 0.00239** 
 (0.0017) (0.001
0) 
(0.0131) (0.004
7) 
(0.0018) (0.0009) 
       
Air Pollution 0.868* 0.531**
* 
2.432*** 0.236 1.165*** 0.235 
 (0.3407) (0.142
8) 
(0.6478) (0.237
3) 
(0.3396) (0.1304) 
       
Income -0.0000424 -
0.000181 
-0.000467 -
0.000921 
-0.000188 -
0.000976** 
 (0.0009) (0.000
4) 
(0.0013) (0.000
6) 
(0.0007) (0.0003) 
Controls*** Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 390 390 374 374 764 764 
R2 0.945 0.987 0.930 0.966 0.933 0.983 
Standard errors in parentheses  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
* Variables have been normalized per 100,000 residents 
** High income States are the ones who they income in 2015 is above the average income in this 
dataset ($57000) 
*** Housing prices, number of the police officers, rate of unemployment, year trend, State and year 
fixed effects 
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Clean energy vs. coal-based energy 
In the last attempt, I compare the results of the mechanism approach between clean energy and 
coal-based energy. Tables 14 and 15 show the results when violent crime rates is the dependent 
variable. Air pollution is the mechanism in the first table, and income is the mechanism in the 
second. Similarly, Tables 16 and 17 depict the result while the dependent variable is mortality 
rates. Setting the violent crime rates as our dependent variable, we can see that when using clean 
energy, the mechanism effect of air pollution is 4.3E-4; when switching clean energy to coal-based 
energy, this effect is bigger and equal to 6.9E-4. On the other hand, the income effect is smaller in 
clean energy versus coal-based energy (-4.5E-6 versus -1.04E-4). The similar scenario is valid 
when we switch the dependent variable to mortality rates. Utilizing clean energy, the mechanism 
effect of air pollution is 7.97E-5, while switching clean energy to coal-based energy, this effect is 
bigger and equal to 1.4E-4. At the same time, the income effect is smaller in clean energy versus 
coal-based energy (-2.7E-5 versus -5.4E-4). I can conclude that switching coal-based energy to 
clean energy decreases air pollution and income at the same time. However, the magnitude of the 
effect of this change is higher via income channel compared to air pollution. While air pollution 
impact decreases by around forty percent for violent crime rates and mortality rates, income effect 
diminished by 95 percent. This computation shows that moving away from coal-based energy and 
utilize clean energy to generate power, almost neutralizes the income mechanism while decreasing 
air pollution significantly; accordingly, social damages that arise from energy utilization drops as 
well as environmental externalities. 
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Table 24: Basic results for the mechanism approach (air pollution is the mechanism). The independent 
variables, respectively, are clean energy consumption and coal-based consumption, and the dependent is 
violent crime rates*. 
 Energy: Clean  Energy: Coal-based  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Violent 
Crime 
Air 
Pollution 
Violent 
Crime 
Violent  
Crime 
Air 
Pollution 
Violent 
Crime 
Energy 0.00392*** 0.000433*
* 
0.00349*** 0.00356 0.000592 0.00287 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) 
       
Air 
Pollution 
  1.000**   1.165*** 
   (0.343)   (0.340) 
Controls*
* 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 765 765 765 764 764 764 
R2 0.93 0.84 0.94 0.93 0.84 0.93 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
* Variables have been normalized per 100,000 residents 
** Housing prices, number of the police officers, rate of unemployment, income, year trend, state and 
year fixed effects 
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Table 25: Basic results for the mechanism approach (income is the mechanism). The independent 
variables, respectively, are clean energy consumption and coal-based consumption, and the dependent is 
violent crime rates*. 
 Energy: Clean  Energy: Coal-based  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Violent 
Crime 
Income 
Violent 
Crime 
Violent  
Crime 
Income 
Violent 
Crime 
Energy 0.00348*** 0.0294 0.00349*** 0.00277 0.548*** 0.00287 
 (0.001) (0.053) (0.001) (0.002) (0.137) (0.002) 
       
Income   -0.000154   -0.000188 
   (0.001)   (0.001) 
Control
s** 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 765 765 765 764 764 764 
R2 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.93 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
* Variables have been normalized per 100,000 residents 
** Housing prices, number of the police officers, rate of unemployment, air pollution, year trend, state 
and year fixed effects 
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Table 26: Basic results for the mechanism approach (air pollution is the mechanism). The independent 
variables, respectively, are clean energy consumption and coal-based consumption, and the dependent is 
mortality rates*. 
 Energy: Clean  Energy: Coal-based  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Mortality Air 
Pollution 
Mortality Mortality Air 
Pollution 
Mortality 
Energy 0.00134*** 0.000433** 0.00126*** 0.00253** 0.000592 0.00239** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
       
Air 
Pollution 
  0.184   0.235 
   (0.127)   (0.130) 
       
Controls*
* 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 765 765 765 764 764 764 
R2 0.98 0.84 0.98 0.98 0.84 0.98 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
* Variables have been normalized per 100,000 residents 
** Housing prices, number of the police officers, rate of unemployment, income, year trend, state and 
year fixed effects 
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Table 27: Basic results for the mechanism approach (income is the mechanism). The independent 
variables, respectively, are clean energy consumption and coal-based consumption, and the dependent is 
mortality rates*. 
 Energy: Clean  Energy: Coal-based  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Mortality Income Mortality Mortality Income Mortality 
Energy 0.00123*** 0.0294 0.00126*** 0.00186* 0.548*** 0.00239** 
 (0.000) (0.053) (0.000) (0.001) (0.137) (0.001) 
       
Income   -0.000913**   -0.000976** 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Controls
** 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 765 765 765 764 764 764 
R2 0.98 0.93 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.98 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
* Variables have been normalized per 100,000 residents 
** Housing prices, number of the police officers, rate of unemployment, air pollution, year trend, state 
and year fixed effects 
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